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INTRODUCTION
China’s growing economic and military clout generates scrutiny, opti-
mism, insecurity, opportunism, opprobrium, and unease around the world,
especially in the United States.  Many question China’s role on the world
stage.  Politicians and academics openly doubt China abides by interna-
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tional law and other global standards of state conduct promulgated by
Western liberal democracies since the end of World War II.  The game
may change—international trade,1 territorial and maritime disputes,2 envi-
ronmental law,3 human rights,4 arms control,5 riparian rights,6 cyber-
1. President Obama and Governor Romney both referenced China’s trade violations
during the 2012 presidential campaign. Obama complained that China’s subsidies “directly
harm working men and women . . . in the Midwest. It’s not right; it’s against the rules, and we
will not let it stand.” Mark Landler, In Car Country, Obama Trumpets China Trade Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/us/politics/
in-car-country-obama-trumpets-china-trade-case.html. Romney accused China of cheating
and killing (presumably American) jobs. Philip Rucker & Jia Lynn Yang, Obama Campaign
Attacks Romney on Chinese Investments, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.washing
tonpost.com/business/economy/obama-campaign-attacks-romney-on-chinese-investments/
2012/09/28/adfb8302-08cb-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_story.html. Romney wrote that “China
seeks advantage through systematic exploitation of other economies” through subsidies, cur-
rency manipulation and theft of intellectual property. Mitt Romney, Op-Ed., China Must
Respect the Free-trade System, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/romney-china-must-respect-the-free-trade-system/2011/10/13/gIQAiffViL_story
.html. If elected, Romney famously promised to brand China a currency manipulator on his
first day in office. Tania Branigan, Mitt Romney Renews Promise to Label China a Currency
Manipulator, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2012, 06:32 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/
oct/23/mitt-romney-china-currency-manipulator.
2. China is currently embroiled in maritime and territorial disputes with India, Bru-
nei, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. See Beina Xu, South China Sea Ten-
sions, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/china/south-
china-sea-tensions/p29790 (noting bilateral tensions between China and the Philippines, Viet-
nam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei); Gardiner Harris & Edward Wong, Where China Meets
India in a High-Altitude Desert, Push Comes to Shove, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2013, at A4,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/world/asia/where-china-meets-india-push-
comes-to-shove.html (noting bilateral disputes between China and India and China and Ja-
pan). China rejected a request by the Philippines to submit their dispute to the UN’s Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. See China Rejects Philippines’ Arbitral Request, CHINA
DAILY (Feb. 19, 2013, 8:33 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-02/19/content_162
38133.htm.
3. See Michael Faure & Song Ying, Introduction, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL EN-
VIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 1, 5–6
(Michael Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008) (discussing legal remedies for environmental harm
under domestic Chinese and international law).
4. The State Department and Human Rights Watch both issue annual reports—usu-
ally quite critical—reviewing China’s human rights record for the previous year. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CHINA 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, available at http://www.state
.gov/documents/organization/204405.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013:
CHINA, available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/china. The
United Nations Human Rights Council’s most recent periodic review came out in 2009. See
U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic Review, Report of the
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – China, A/HRC/11/25 (Oct. 5, 2009),
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/162/99/PDF/G0916299. pdf?
OpenElement.
5. See WENDY FRIEMAN, CHINA, ARMS CONTROL, AND NON-PROLIFERATION 2-3
(2013) (noting a tendency among U.S. scholars to criticize Chinese arms control efforts using
American standards, but a strong record of Chinese compliance using international
standards).
6. See Andrew Jacobs, Plans to Harness Chinese River’s Power Threaten a Region,
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/asia/plans-to-harness-
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crime,7 endangered species8—but the concern remains the same: is China
an international scofflaw?
Scholarly and popular discourses insist China’s increased participation
in international organizations has not effectuated deeper engagement
with, or respect for, international law.  Instead, the dominant discourse
goes, China extracts the benefits of global institutions, but undertakes
minimal commitments to the international legal regime.9  By minimizing
new commitments, China fails to bring its laws, regulations, codes, interna-
tional aid practices, and other legal norms into line with global standards.
China’s adherence to international law assumes greater urgency as it leap-
frogs ahead of major world powers in economic growth, military capacity,
technological sophistication, and other areas.  Is China reaping the bene-
fits of globalization without paying the costs?  Or is China, like any other
rational state actor, simply gaming the system?
Despite its prevalence, the “China as cheat” conceit does not capture
China’s dynamic and evolving relationship with international law.  If
China is indeed an international scofflaw,10 why would it ratify so many
chinas-nu-river-threaten-a-region.html (“So far China has been largely unresponsive to the
concerns of its neighbors, among them India, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Russia and Vietnam.
Since 1997, China has declined to sign the [UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Naviga-
tional Uses of International Watercourses] that would govern the 13 major transnational riv-
ers on its territory.”). Yet the article omits two key facts: (1) the Convention itself has not
taken effect because only sixteen (of thirty-five needed) states have ratified it, and (2) none
of China’s neighbors has signed or ratified the convention. In other words, China is similarly
situated to its democratic and authoritarian neighbors. See Convention on the Law of the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, opened for signature May 21, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 700, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTS
ONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&lang=en#Participants.
7. See Steve Holland, Obama, China’s Xi Discuss Cybersecurity Dispute in Phone
Call, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2013, 6:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-usa-
china-obama-call-idUSBRE92D11G20130314. In a press conference following his call to
President Xi Jinping, President Obama stated “We’ve made it very clear to China . . . that . . .
we expect them to follow international norms and abide by international rules.” Id.
8. China faces criticism for consuming large amounts of shark fin, ivory, sea cucum-
bers, and other exotic creatures. See, e.g., Dexter Roberts, Shark Fin Soup Still Sells Despite
China’s Extravagance Crackdown, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www
.businessweek.com/articles/2013-12-20/shark-fin-soup-still-sells-despite-chinas-extravagance-
crackdown (“China is the largest consumer of shark fin soup in the world.”); Damian Gram-
maticas, Uncovering China’s Illegal Ivory Trade, BBC (Feb. 13, 2014, 4:08 AM), www.bbc
.com/news/world-asia-china-26167893 (noting that China is cracking down on smuggling of
ivory amidst an “unprecedented surge in illegal trafficking”).
9. See, e.g., Samuel S. Kim, China’s International Organizational Behaviour, in CHI-
NESE FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY & PRACTICE 401, 419 (Thomas W. Robinson & David
Shambaugh eds., 1994) (arguing that China extracts maximal benefits from nuclear disarma-
ment treaties, but has not disarmed itself and thus assumes minimal obligations). But see
Pitman B. Potter, China and the International Legal System: Challenges of Participation, 191
CHINA Q. 699, 701 (2007) (arguing that China selectively incorporates international norms
most conducive to its economic growth and the preferences of its elites).
10. It is worth noting that scholars increasingly level the same criticism at the United
States. See, e.g., David A. Koplow, Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United
States Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?, 37 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 53, 71 (2013) (not-
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treaties and join the vast majority of international organizations in the first
place?11  It could be solely for show; a country could join a body without
ever intending adherence to its rules or tenets.  Yet membership alone has
not stanched the criticisms that China does not play by the rules; many still
posit that China lacks the capacity and political will to abide by interna-
tional law.  In practice, China has played a relatively passive role in many
international institutions, at least for a country of its economic and demo-
graphic heft.12  To the extent that China voices objections in global gov-
ernance institutions like the United Nations, it normally aims to restrain
the body from using force or applying sanctions.13  However, China’s hesi-
tancy has neither rendered the United Nations moribund nor subverted
the creation and promulgation of new policies.
Instead, China selectively incorporates the norms promulgated by in-
ternational institutions.14  A dynamic give-and-take, rather than disregard,
characterizes China’s interactions with international institutions.15  If
China partially adheres to international law, it is more useful to examine
those instances and contexts wherein its adherence is strong, weak, or
equivocal.  One can then devise tactics to bring China more in line with
international norms.  But a thorough analysis must precede such offerings.
Branding China an outlaw may make for good stump speeches and op-ed
pieces, but China’s pattern of compliance actually requires more detailed
examination.  Like the United States, China exhibits differential levels of
compliance, depending upon the particular regime under examination.16
ing that the US can “get away with” violating treaty obligations in the short run, but that
lawless behavior in the long run “is profoundly not in the U.S. interest”).
11. See generally ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS, AND GLOBAL SECURITY 60 (2007) (noting that China had joined 273 multilateral
institutions by 2000, most of them since 1979).
12. China cuts an international image of relative reluctance. But it does work closely
with United Nations Development Program and United Nations Environmental Program to
build environmental and infrastructural capacity. See Du Juan, Spending Surge for Renew-
ables, CHINA DAILY (July 31, 2003, 7:22 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-07/31/
content_16854737.htm.
13. This position accords with China’s long-held belief that national sovereignty is par-
amount. Any attempt to intervene in another country’s “internal affairs” is viewed with great
suspicion. Consequently, at the UN Security Council, China has vetoed, or abstained from,
many resolutions to sanction threats to peace in states such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan,
Syria, and Myanmar. According to one scholar, abstention is “China’s preferred instrument
for showing its opposition.” Nicola Contessi, China’s Stance on Darfur in the UN Security
Council, 41 SECURITY DIALOGUE 323, 326 (2011). China likewise abstained in a UN Security
Council resolution calling on members not to recognize the results of the Crimean referen-
dum. Ben Brown, Ukraine Crisis: Russia Isolated in UN Crimea Vote, BBC (Mar. 15, 2014,
1:37 PM), www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26595776.
14. See Potter, supra note 9, at 700.
15. KENT, supra note 11, at 4–5 (noting that China’s compliance with international law
has improved in the last few decades and is better in certain disciplines than in others).
16. The United States’ adherence to international law is also variable, depending upon
the particular regime. In monetary policy, human rights, international trade and other areas,
observers note discrepancies between provisions of international law, and practices of US
legal actors. See, e.g., JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32014, WTO DIS-
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The main difference is that the United States largely created these institu-
tions and shaped their rules, whereas China, in many instances, has only
recently joined them.
This paper focuses on one index of China’s compliance with interna-
tional law: its implementation of rulings by the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Recent scholarship un-
derstands China’s behavior in the DSB as part of its “socialization” into
international law and broader acceptance of international law’s mantle.17
Some see China as an increasingly sophisticated user of DSB procedural
machinery.18  And while others have examined China’s behavior in indi-
vidual cases,19 no scholar has done the painstaking work of tracking
whether and how China actually implements DSB rulings and recommen-
dations.  This paper fills that important gap by (1) specifying the inconsis-
tent Chinese laws, (2) examining what efforts China has made to
implement DSB rulings, and (3) articulating a theory of paper compliance
to capture this aspect of China’s behavior.
By articulating a theory of paper compliance in the context of China’s
DSB conduct, I fashion a tool to decode the question of international law
compliance.  The theory predicts China will revise its domestic laws and
PUTE SETTLEMENT: STATUS OF U.S. COMPLIANCE IN PENDING CASES (2011) (describing
eleven cases where the United States has either partially or wholly failed to implement World
Trade Organization [WTO] rulings); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behav-
ior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
819, 827 (2000) (noting that the United States has “a perfect record” of complying with IMF
obligations on exchange rates and current account restrictions); Richard C. Dieter, The US
Death Penalty and International Law: US Compliance with the Torture and Race Conventions,
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (Nov. 12, 1998), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
us-death-penalty-and-international-law-us-compliance-torture-and-race-conventions (noting
that executions of juveniles, the mentally incapacitated and foreign nationals not informed of
their consular rights violate the United States’ obligations under the Convention against Tor-
ture, while its racially unequal application of the death penalty likely violates the Race Con-
vention). To rework Henkin’s oft cited maxim, all states do not obey international law some
of the time. See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d
ed. 1979). See also Colin B. Picker, Reputational Fallacies in International Law: A Compara-
tive Review of United States and Canadian Trade Actions, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 67, 115
(2004) (noting that the idea that the U.S. suffers an undeserved reputation for violating inter-
national law).
17. Marcia Don Harpaz, Sense and Sensibilities of China and WTO Dispute Settlement,
44 J. WORLD TRADE 1155 (2010). Harpaz writes that “when it has lost . . . China has com-
plied with the panel/[Appellate Body] findings, by changing the measures deemed illegal,
demonstrating willingness to accept third party adjudication.” Id. at 1177. Harpaz apparently
takes at face value China’s assertions of full compliance. For reasons we explore in Part IV, I
believe China has not fully complied in several cases.
18. Henry Gao, China’s Ascent in Global Trade Governance: From Rule Taker to Rule
Shaker and Maybe Rule Maker?, in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DE-
VELOPMENT 153, 170 (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011).
19. See Julia Ya Qin, Pushing the Limits of Global Governance: Trading Rights, Cen-
sorship and Jurisprudence – A Commentary on the China – Publications Case, 10 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 271 (2011); Xiaohui Wu, Case Note, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 9 CHI-
NESE J. INT’L L. 415 (2010).
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regulations to implement DSB rulings in most cases.  This matters because
China has not shown such adherence in other international legal re-
gimes.20  But China’s implementation of rulings tells us only part of the
broader story about compliance.21  Looking at legal reform in a vacuum
overlooks other modes of resistance China deploys to avoid complying
with basic WTO norms. Even now, China promulgates policies clearly vio-
lating basic WTO disciplines, suggesting that even while the implementa-
tion record is strong (though imperfect), it is still contesting basic WTO
norms in other areas.22  I develop paper compliance as a theoretical tool
to distinguish description and behavior at a more nuanced level previously
absent in debate over Chinese trade practices.
The article proceeds in four parts.  Part I introduces the theory of pa-
per compliance, placing it within the larger framework of international law
and international relations theory.  Part II reviews China’s history of inter-
national law and institutions, detecting an abiding ambivalence, if not an-
tipathy, between China and various international treaties and practices.
Part III shifts the focus to the WTO, explaining WTO compliance mecha-
nisms and then homing in on China’s record of compliance more gener-
ally.  Part IV examines the WTO cases against China, and the manner in
which China implemented the DSB’s rulings and recommendations.  A
brief conclusion reveals that China’s record of compliance, impressive on
paper, still reflects an imperfect attempt to absorb WTO norms.
I. PAPER COMPLIANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
Compliance with international law has generated debate for several
decades.  At the most basic level, scholars agree that the issue of compli-
ance examines how and whether individual states conform to the rules,
laws, and practices articulated in international law.  Beyond this kernel of
concurrence, however, compliance theorists disagree as to which aspects
of state behavior best explain the issues and forms of adherence, absorp-
tion, deviation, or rejection of international law.  International relations
theory refracts the compliance issue into realist, liberalist, and constructiv-
ist (or institutionalist) frames, which highlight different elements of state
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. I appreciate the clarification of my colleague, Peter Gerhart. For this paper, com-
pliance refers broadly to a state’s conformity to the rules and norms of a particular interna-
tional legal regime. Implementation narrowly refers to the discrete efforts and action a state
takes to conduce to the rules of a particular regime, or decisions rendered by an authoritative
body. See Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations
and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 539 (Walter Carlsnaes,
Thomas Risse-Kappen, & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2002).
22. See generally China’s Compliance with the World Trade Organization and Interna-
tional Trade Rules: Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 113th Cong. 2–3 (2014) (writ-
ten testimony of Elizabeth A. Drake, Partner, Stewart and Stewart), available at http://www
.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Hearing%20-%20WTO%20-%20
Elizabeth%20Drake%20Written%20Statement.pdf (listing Chinese subsidies, local content
and technology transfer requirements, and discrimination by state-owned enterprises against
foreign companies, all of which violate WTO disciplines).
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action.23  While paper compliance aligns most closely to the basic realist
insight that states operate merely to advance national interests, it also en-
gages with liberal and constructivist insights.  This article follows the ex-
ample of “analytical eclecticism” to draw on all three schools, rather than
privilege any one of them exclusively.24  States operate on multiple stages,
like their human operators.  They advocate for themselves, induce others
to agree, and then devise plans action to effectuate their goals. A multiva-
lent frame captures these varied effects and efforts.
A. Realism
Realism views international law, and the related issue of compliance
more generally, as epiphenomenal.  In this view, foreign affairs unfold as
powerful states jockey to enhance their power vis-a`-vis competitors in sin-
gle-minded pursuit of national interests. States abide by international law
only insofar as its prescriptions support their positions or deliver concrete
benefits.  The realist view is encapsulated by the maxim that “international
law ‘is not really law’ because it lacks effective institutions” and binding
enforcement mechanisms.25  To be sure, China’s pursuit of long-term and
short-term interests generates insight into China’s behavior at the DSB.
B. Liberalism
Classic liberal theory depicts international law as coordinating state
behavior along certain ideological lines developed during the Enlighten-
ment: democracy, human rights, and market capitalism.  The protagonists
of this drama were the classical liberal jurisdictions: the United States,
Western Europe, and a few Commonwealth countries.  Illiberal nations—
Russia, China, Cuba—did not subscribe to the particular mix of ideology,
rights, and markets, and thus fell outside the scholarly focus.
For liberals, compliance is the default setting by which states enter
international organizations.  Cooperation is presumed by virtue of the fact
that the state entered the agreement in the first place.  In addition, the
concurrence of the international organization’s values with those of partic-
ipating states promotes compliance with its underlying message.  The
Chayes’ place special importance on “jawboning,” when states prod the
“miscreant” state through repeated sessions of argumentation, exposition
and persuasion.26  Insuring compliance involves applying pressure on
23. See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POL-
ICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS 1–5 (2010).
24. PETER KATZENSTEIN & RUDRA SIL, BEYOND PARADIGMS: ANALYTICAL ECLECTI-
CISM IN WORLD POLITICS 2 (2010) (advocating a mixed methodological approach to study
international relations, including the use of realist, liberal and constructivist lenses).
25. Terry Nardin, Ethical Traditions in International Affairs, in TRADITIONS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ETHICS 1, 13 (Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992). The realist tradition
includes Thucydides, Machiavelli and John Austin as its advocates.
26. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COM-
PLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 25–26 (1995) (“[T]he funda-
mental instrument for maintaining compliance with treaties at an acceptable level is an
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states to fulfill obligations, and the open dialogues help the parties air is-
sues of mutual concern to the implementation effort.
This paper deepens that discussion by examining China, normally con-
sidered an illiberal or authoritarian state,27 and analyzing its adaptation to
the WTO, the archetypal neoliberal institution.28  It will surprise some
that illiberal states actually conform their behavior to international institu-
tions.  This is not a case of “beating us at our own game.”  But it does
show how one school’s fundamental assumptions—that liberal states best
exemplify the rule of law on the international level—may creak a bit.
China has a strong, though not spotless, history in implementing WTO
rulings and recommendations.  The reasons why and how China attains
this level of compliance will be further elucidated in this article.
C. Constructivism
Constructivism assumes dynamism within states.  Rather than acting
as fixed monoliths, states interact with other states, international institu-
tions, and various external actors, and shift their behavior and interests
accordingly.  Think of a student entering college.  He matriculates with a
core of set interests and a more or less fixed personality, a set of truths
that accommodate his worldview, his beliefs about the exterior world, and
his connection to it.  But the school opens his mind to new inquiries, disci-
plines, activities, ideologies, and thought patterns.  He may reconsider his
beliefs and dogmas, test them against what he learns in class, and realign
them to accommodate new insights and conflicting information.  The
school shapes or “constructs” him.
Constructivism posits that international institutions influence member
states.  Through repeated interactions by the human agents who represent
them, states articulate their interests to other members of the organiza-
tion, and seek to persuade other states to join them in an intended course
of action.29  This flux—that a state is as solidly constituted as the humans
attending the meetings—may be the key contribution of constructivism to
international relations and international legal theory.  States are “always
iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider pub-
lic. We propose that this process is usefully viewed as management, rather than
enforcement.”).
27. See Elizabeth J. Perry, The Illiberal Challenge of Authoritarian China, 8 TAIWAN J.
DEMOCRACY 3, 4–5 (2012) (describing how agitation from Chinese civil society may actually
sustain the authoritarian regime); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 268 (2007) (noting how China is becoming increasingly
liberal, even as it remains an authoritarian regime).
28. See Nitsan Chorev, The Institutional Project of Neo-Liberal Globalism: The Case of
the WTO, 34 THEORY & SOC’Y 317, 320 (2005) (“[T]he establishment of the WTO marked a
turning point in the governance of trade under neo-liberal globalism, from a ‘trade liberaliza-
tion’ project, in which governments were allowed to compensate those suffering injuries due
to the process of free trade, to a “trade neo-liberalization” project, where such compensation
was no longer permitted.”).
29. See PAUL R. VIOTTI & MARK V. KAUPPI, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
278 (5th ed. 2012).
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under construction.”30  Constructivism stresses the role that institutions
play in effectuating change.  Rather than fixed billiard balls, crashing into
each other on the green felt of the world stage, constructivist states oper-
ate more like clay clumps, running into each other, partially peeling off
onto other clumps, transferring information and practices, pushing others
up against the walls of the institution, and bearing the imprints of contact
with many other states.
Constructivists believe that institutions matter.  Institutions influence
states, reorganize their priorities and behaviors, and establish the rituals
by which states meet and address disputes.  Institutions regulate state be-
havior by telling states what they can and cannot do.  The degree to which
institutions inform state policy and conduct is of course variable.  But it
reflects an important element of international law and relations.  States,
little units of sovereignty bumping up against each another, engage inter-
nationally through either the intimacy of bilateral relations or the tightly
articulated choreography of international institutions.
D. Paper Compliance
The theory of paper compliance builds on these foundations.  It posits
that China will entertain legislative and regulatory reform to achieve a
result compliant with a WTO ruling.  These efforts are important because
international law theorists, and China’s own record of compliance, would
not necessarily produce a strong record of compliance.  China often re-
ports to the DSB that it had achieved “full compliance” with its interna-
tional obligations.  But the matter is not always so simple.
The mere hazard of legislative reform does not, however, necessarily
mean that China has fulfilled its implementation obligations.  First, despite
what China claims in status reports, it has not fully implemented a number
of decisions.  Jawboning in Geneva has improved China’s compliance re-
cord, as regular discussions with other states (including disputants), have
induced China to acknowledge, accept, and adhere to its international ob-
ligations.  The problem is that many regulations deemed inconsistent re-
main in effect.  China has not gone back to scrub its legislative and
regulatory codes clean of all inconsistent regulations.  It has, in effect,
carved a zone of autonomy beyond which the DSB may not penetrate.  In
the cases discussed below—DS 362 (involving intellectual property en-
forcement), DS 363 (trading rights for publications) DS 373 (financial in-
formation services)—China did not annul several regulations, or revise
them so as to avoid the point of the ruling.31
30. Id. at 279.
31. See infra Part IV (analyzing China’s efforts to implement these three WTO rul-
ings).  Though beyond the temporal scope of this article, China’s implementation record in a
couple of very recent cases has also raised questions. In the electronic payments case (DS
413), for example, the U.S. has questioned whether China has opened up its market to for-
eign credit card companies. See Doug Palmer, U.S., China Spar on Electronic Payments, PO-
LITICO, Jan. 24, 2014. Likewise, in the grain oriented, flat-rolled electrical steel case (DS 414),
the US has requested consultations with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to determine if
534 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:525
Second, paper compliance captures the larger resistance China presses
against the WTO.  WTO litigation can cure, or at least target, inconsistent
laws and regulations.  But China continues to introduce policies that
clearly run afoul of basic tenets of the multilateral trading system: mini-
mizing subsidies, maintaining transparency, opening market access, pro-
tecting intellectual property, avoiding export restrictions, treating foreign
entities equally, and so on.  If international organizations influence state
behavior, as constructivists predict, the degree of China’s normative en-
gagement with WTO rulings is quite limited.  The United States and E.U.
wield a tool to challenge China’s domestic laws.  But China blunts this tool
by perpetuating policies that contravene basic WTO principles.  With one
exception, most disputes against China involve programs implemented af-
ter its accession in 2001.  The DSB has not meaningfully influenced the
development of China’s political economy; the WTO litigation process can
shear away layers of non-conformity (if the state agrees to do so), but
cannot add them on.
Paper compliance also reflects China’s “thin” domestic rule of law cul-
ture.32  Revising laws and regulations in China signifies less than it would
in Western liberal democracies with robust legal institutions.  The Chinese
legal system can stop on a dime and change direction without undergoing
the rough-and-tumble of democratic deliberation.33  Under one-party rule
and a unitary governance structure, the Chinese party-state dictates the
passage of laws and regulations and coordinates changes among branches
of government with minimal institutional friction.  Not that there is an ab-
sence of tension between Chinese agencies.  But they act with far less in-
dependence, and far fewer policy choices, than they would in the United
States or other Western political systems.
Finally, it is important to situate China in a comparative context.  But
who are China’s peers?  Developing countries like India and Brazil or ma-
jor trading powers like the United States and Japan?  If we look at the
United States and E.U.’s records of implementing WTO rulings, we also
find significant non-compliance within the trade system.  Both the United
States and E.U. have refused to implement DSB rulings, and proceeded to
arbitrate the amount of compensation owed.  The United States has en-
countered implementation difficulties when dealing with certain issues,
such as the Cuba embargo, important sovereign powers like taxation, or
when a congressional act is at stake.34  The E.U. has also refused or signifi-
China has failed to implement the body’s recommendations. See Request for Consultations
by the United States, China-Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented
Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, ¶ 1, WT/DS414/15 (Jan. 16, 2014).
32. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 5 (2002).
33. The United States Congress, for example, has earned a reputation for political
paralysis due to sharp polarization between Democrats and Republicans. See Drew DeSilver,
Partisan Polarization, in Congress and Among Public, is Greater than Ever, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (July 17, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/17/partisan-polariza
tion-in-congress-and-among-public-is-greater-than-ever/.
34. Bruce Wilson, The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Operation: A Brief
Overview of the First Ten Years, in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST
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cantly delayed rulings.35  Perhaps these are exceptions that prove the oth-
erwise strong rule of compliance with DSB decisions.36  But compared
with other liberal trading powers, China exhibits a high degree of compli-
ance.  China’s pliancy is somewhat incongruous with its interactions with
other international legal regimes.37
II. CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW:
HISTORY AND THEORY
Before examining China’s implementation of WTO decisions, we must
understand more broadly its attitudes and interactions with international
law.  The WTO occupies an important niche among international organi-
zations.  China’s 2001 accession completed its entry into the international
community, at least in terms of membership in major postwar interna-
tional institutions.38  China’s experience with international organizations
remains a relatively recent phenomenon, providing a shorter track record
to evaluate China as an international actor and the degree of its normative
commitment.  The People’s Republic of China (PRC) only joined the
United Nations in 1971, surmounting decades of opposition led by the
United States.39  The efforts by Western powers to exclude China from the
United Nations informed China’s approach towards international law
TEN YEARS 15, 23 (Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson eds., 2005) (noting compliance is more
difficult when legislative changes are needed). John Magnus suggests that decisions adverse
to the U.S. touch on fundamental sovereign prerogatives such as raising and spending money.
John Magnus, Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions: Is There a Crisis?, in KEY
ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 34, at 244. In the “Havana Club” case, the
US refused to enforce a Cuban trademark subsequently licensed to a French company due to
the embargo on Cuban products. See Donald R. Dinan, An Analysis of the United States-
Cuba “Havana Club” Rum Case Before the World Trade Organization, 26 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 337, 337 (2002).
35. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Impor-
tation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU (Nov. 26, 2008). In No-
vember 1997, the DSB found Europe’s import and licensing schemata for bananas violated
GATT.  After a decade of new regulations, compliance proceedings, and political negotia-
tions, the dispute was formally resolved in 2009. See Press Release, World Trade Organiza-
tion, Lamy Hails Accord Ending Long Running Banana Dispute (Dec. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr591_e.htm.
36. See Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 397, 401 (2007) (noting members
generally comply with adverse rulings, but the United States and E.U. have both “exper-
ienced residual compliance problems”).
37. See infra Part II.B.
38. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has had a few spells of isolation from the
rest of the world, or at least the West, especially during the Cultural Revolution and immedi-
ately after Tiananmen. Yet for the past two decades, it has engaged in a wide variety of
international institutions and organizations. See Timothy Webster, East Asia Institutionalises:
China, Japan and the Vogue for Free Trade, 77 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 301, 304–05 (2008).
39. See Jerome A. Cohen, Hungdah Chiu, China, and International Law: A Life Well
Spent, 27 MD. J. INT’L L. 9, 17 (2012) (“The United States also opposed the PRC’s entry into
the United Nations under any formula.”).
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throughout the early years of the People’s Republic and continue to do so
today.40
A. History of Chinese Interactions with International Law
China has had a long and complicated relationship with international
law for most of the past 200 years.  Throughout the nineteenth century,
China was forced to sign dozens of unequal treaties with Western powers
and, eventually, Japan.41  Public international law, and modern treaty
practice more generally, came to China not as a guarantor of mutual bene-
fit and sovereign equality, but as a harbinger of inequitable interactions
with more powerful states.  China’s first modern international treaty, the
Treaty of Nanjing (1842), ended the Opium War, which Britain waged to
ply China with opium.  In a peculiar foreshadowing of its WTO accession,
the Treaty required China to extend “most-favored-nation treatment” to
British traders.42  This was part of a broader schema of unequal treatment
that, among other things, forced China to set low tariffs on imports form
the West (but did not grant China reciprocal treatment for its exports to
the West), granted British citizens extraterritorial legal status in China,
and required China pay Britain a large indemnity.43
During the twentieth century, several events impeded China’s integra-
tion into the international community and colored its view of international
law.  After fighting alongside the Allies during World War I, China as-
sumed an awkward place at the table of the Paris Peace Conference.  As a
victor eligible for the spoils, China expected preferential treatment in the
negotiations, or at least treatment equal to that enjoyed by other victors.
But China was not a member of the “Big Four” countries that dominated
the Conference and set the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.44  Especially
galling was the Treaty’s transfer of German territorial concessions on
China’s Shandong peninsula to Japan, not back to China.45  Territorial
40. Id. at 18 (“China’s distrust of the Western-controlled United Nations was matched
by its distrust of the international law reflected in UN practice.”).
41. See generally DONG WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL
HISTORY (2005). While the exact number of treaties is not known, China signed unequal
treaties with over a dozen European states—including Britain (1842), France (1844), Sweden
(1847), Russia (1851)—as well as the U.S. (1844) and Japan (1871). Id. at 10.
42. JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY 200 (2d ed.,
2006).
43. Id. at 200-03. For a terrific account of unequal treaties between China and various
Western powers, see TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES,
AND MODERN LAW 122–130 (2013).
44. See The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/89875.htm (last visited May 14, 2014).
45. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty
of Versailles), June 28, 1919, art. 156, 2 Bevans 43 (transferring German rights in Shandong
territory, railways, mines and even submarine cables to Japan). Article 157 transferred all
“movable and immovable property owned by the German State” to Japan. Id. art. 157. Arti-
cle 158 transferred all “archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents” to Japan. Id. art.
158.
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concessions in China may have felt natural to the Allies, many of which
enjoyed colonial enclaves in other Chinese cities and throughout Asia and
Africa. But the sense of betrayal was quite keen, so much so that the Chi-
nese delegate did not sign the Treaty.46
Despite China’s objections, the Treaty later took effect.  Nor did
China forestall the establishment of the League of Nations, the fated fore-
runner of the United Nations, and other major consequences of the Treaty
of Versailles.  The League has won praise for fostering early twentieth cen-
tury multilateralism, and opprobrium for its failure to prevent World War
II.47  But the League’s response to Japan’s 1931 invasion of China was
ineffectual.  Writing a few years after the invasion, Lauterpacht derided
the “illusory value” of the League’s “fundamental aspect”: its ability to
protect member states.48  The first doubts about the League’s capacity to
reach its ambitions—collective security, world peace, halting aggression,
multilateralism—were sown in its ineffectual response to the Mukden
Incident.49
The Japanese invasion of China violated the League’s core principle of
collective security, where an act of war against one member was “an act of
war against all.”50  China and Japan were both members of the League, so
Japan’s invasion of China should have been interpreted as against all
league members (which then included Britain, France and Germany, but
not the United States).  The League’s Charter bound members to sever
trade with Japan, prohibit “all intercourse” between their citizens and Jap-
anese citizens and at least discuss, if not deploy, military support for
China.51  But the League failed to muster the political will, economic re-
sources, and military power necessary to expel Japan from China.  Indeed,
its lackluster response probably contributed to Japan’s fuller annexation of
northeast China and the founding of Manchukuo, a puppet regime in-
stalled by the Japanese government.
After the Anti-Japanese War, as World War II is known in Chinese,
China again found itself on the margins of international law.  During the
war, the Republic of China (ROC) participated alongside the Allies at the
major conferences in Dumbarton Oaks, Bretton Woods, Yalta, Potsdam,
46. LOUISE CHIPLEY SLAVICEK, THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 65 (2010).
47. Some have praised the League’s success in social, economic, humanitarian, and
legal endeavors, including the establishment of both the International Labor Organization
(ILO) and the Permanent Court of International Justice. See, e.g., RUTH HENIG, MAKERS OF
THE MODERN WORLD: THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 174-75 (2010). But its failure to prevent
World War II and to respond to the Japanese invasion of China left serious doubts about its
efficacy and support for world peace. See GCSE Bitesize: Two Important Events, BBC, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/ir1/manchuriarev1.shtml (last visited May
14,, 2014) (noting that the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, coupled with Italy’s invasion of
Abyssinia, “destroyed people’s belief in the ability of the League to stop wars”).
48. H. Lauterpacht, “Resort to War” and the Interpretation of the Covenant During the
Manchurian Dispute, 28 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 43 (1934).
49. See id.
50. League of Nations Covenant art. 16, ¶ 1.
51. Id.
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and others. The Great Powers presiding at these conferences designed the
institutional architecture of the postwar international order: the United
Nations, International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), and World Bank.  These organizations enshrined the
norms and institutions to regulate international law disciplines such as fi-
nance, human rights, trade, and currency.  As at Versailles, China techni-
cally sat at the table.  Yet the Big Three (the U.K., United States, and
U.S.S.R.) aimed to marginalize China and to diminish its influence.  At
Yalta, the Big Three signed a “secret agreement” to cede Chinese territo-
rial interests from (vanquished) Japan to the (victorious) Soviet Union.52
As it did after World War I, China won the war but lost territory, a form of
punishment normally meted out to the losers.  And at Dumbarton Oaks,
where the United Nations was designed, the Soviet Union refused to meet
with the Chinese altogether,53 requiring the Americans to host two confer-
ences: a first conference of the Big Three that decided the major issues of
designing the United Nations, and a second conference of China, the
United States and the U.K., designed primarily to preserve “Chinese dig-
nity”54 after its exclusion in the first place.
The diplomatic legerdemain was not lost on the Chinese, who none-
theless had important ideas to impart to the United Nations.  Ambassador
Wellington Koo introduced Chinese philosophy to the group, but also
sought to inject into the U.N. Charter values such as universality, social
justice, self-determination, and racial equality.55  Needless to say, the Big
Three opposed these values; Britain’s extensive colonial holdings would be
severely disrupted by the principle of self-determination, while the United
States’ Jim Crow laws would be challenged by the concept of racial equal-
ity.56  China’s forward-looking proposals—later enshrined in various U.N.
human rights covenants—were tabled, if they were even entertained in the
first place.
The Chinese civil war further frustrated China’s attempts to join the
international community.  Two Chinas, ideologically and diplomatically
52. At the Yalta Conference of February 1945, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill
planned how to end World War II and rebuild the postwar order. The three men also signed
the “Far Eastern Agreement,” which would restore Russian rights to the commercial port of
Dairen (Dalian) and Port Arthur (Lushun) and cede the Southern Manchurian Railroad
from Japan to a Sino-Soviet joint venture to be established after the war. YEE WAH FOO,
CHIANG KAISHEK’S LAST AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW: THE WARTIME DIARIES OF FU
BINGCHANG 163-64 (2011).
53. ROBERT C. HILDERBRAND, DUMBARTON OAKS: THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR POSTWAR SECURITY 61 (1990). Nor did Churchill believe
China deserved a seat at the negotiations. PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 163 (2d ed. 2003).
54. HILDERBRAND, supra note 53, at 61.
55. LAUREN, supra note 53, at 163.
56. The conference took place during the Jim Crow era of the United States. In addi-
tion, the U.S. Congress had abolished the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act some two years before
(in 1943) to recognize China’s efforts during World War II. In short, racial equality was at
best a distant ideal.
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opposed, emerged from the rubble: the People’s Republic of China and
the Republic of China (Taiwan).  The latter occupied the Chinese U.N.
seat until 1971, enjoying the prestige, diplomatic relationships, and trans-
national linkages conferred by membership.  The PRC, which repeatedly
sought admission to the United Nations and other international organiza-
tions, was repeatedly rebuffed throughout the 1950s and 1960s.57  Some
saw China’s alienation from the international community as the rightful
consequence of its belligerence and aggression.58  But the United Nation’s
persistent rejection also estranged China from many parts of the world,
and the institutional structures that organize and promulgate international
law.  During this period China frequently expressed doubts about the pro-
ject of international law, and the international system more generally.59
The PRC would eventually oust the ROC from the United Nations in
1971.  Concomitant with its joinder, the PRC has advanced along a dis-
tinct—but hardly unilinear—vector towards integration with the world,
global governance institutions, and international law.  China’s 2001 acces-
sion to the WTO ended a nearly 15-year campaign described as the most
difficult and exacting of any WTO accession.60  China’s assumption of
greater burdens than other members shows how international law treats
some parties less favorably than others.  Far from crystallizing a neutral set
of generally applicable rules, international law also perpetuates inequita-
ble treatment, often to China’s disadvantage.  The long history of dispa-
rate treatment of China by international institutions has colored its
receptivity towards international law.  China aims to be part of the global
community and the international institutions that comprise it, yet retains
an underlying suspiciousness about the motivations and purposes underly-
ing those institutions.  This speaks to one underlying reason for paper
compliance: as a statist country, China aims to exert maximal control over
its economy; yet in so doing, it implements policies that contradict the ba-
sic WTO mandate.
57. See KENT, supra note 11, at 34.
58. See id. at 33. In a 1961 address to the UN, U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson
criticized China’s “illegal and aggressive conduct” and called upon “these latter-day empire
builders to abandon their warlike ways and accommodate themselves to the rule of law and
the comity of nations.” Id.
59. See id. at 34. See also JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S CHINA
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 283, 283 (reprinting the text of Foreign Minister Ch’en Yi’s Sep-
tember 29, 1965, Press Conference) (“The United Nations has long been controlled by the
United States  . . . China need not take part in such a United Nations.”).
60. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGAN-
IZATION 113-14 (2005). See also Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implica-
tions for the World Trade Organization Legal System: An Appraisal of the China Accession
Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483, 521 (2003) (“Member-specific rule-making is . . . inher-
ently inconsistent with the WTO rule of law. The WTO-plus obligations of China may be
unique in scope and scale . . .”).
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B. Theories of Chinese Compliance
Scholars disagree about how closely China adheres to international
law, depending upon the particular international regime, their own politi-
cal leanings, the period in which they write, and their own findings.  This
section examines the gamut of scholarly opinion, including both holistic
(multi-disciplinary) assessments and those made from a narrower (i.e. sin-
gle-discipline) perspective.
Legal scholars such as James Feinerman, of Georgetown and Pitman
Potter, of the University of British Columbia, examined a wide swath of
Chinese conduct in fairly broad brushstrokes.  Professor Feinerman sur-
veyed Chinese engagement in the international law disciplines of trade,
investment, environmental protection, arms control, human rights, and re-
lations with Hong Kong.61 But he was unable to detect “a coherent pattern
of compliance—or non-compliance—with international law on the PRC’s
part.”62  In spite of substantial improvement since the Maoist era
(1949–1976), he found that China still “frequently scoffs at international
law.”63
Writing a decade later in the same journal, Professor Potter concluded
that “China’s participation in international legal regimes has increased
substantially in the past ten years.”64  Potter explained China’s compliance
with international trade and human rights law in more nuanced terms,
such as “selective adaptation,”65 but deployed the realist frame described
in Part I.  China does not abide by all of the rules of the regime, but in-
stead implements those norms comporting most readily with the prefer-
ences, policies, and practices at the local level.  In particular, China
adheres to norms already espoused by elites such as government officials,
professionals, scholars, and others with specialized knowledge.66  China
has partially adopted international trade norms like transparency and the
rule of law by enacting and revising laws in intellectual property, trade in
services, and investment.67  But China avoids assimilating to norms such as
market access, IP protection, and anti-dumping that would reflect a fuller
embrace of WTO obligations.68  Potter finds similar selectivity in China’s
compliance with international human rights norms and institutions.69  That
is, China adapts to international legal norms under its own terms.
61. See James V. Feinerman, Chinese Participation in the International Legal Order:
Rogue Elephant or Team Player?, 141 CHINA Q. 186 (1995).
62. Id. at 186.
63. Id. at 186–87.
64. Potter, supra note 9, at 714.
65. Id. at 700.
66. Id. at 701.
67. Though even in these improved areas, Potter points out problems with respect
both to transparency and adherence to the rule of law. Id. at 705.
68. Id.
69. Specifically, China has increased attention to human rights issues by supporting
academic exchange, as well as the publication and translation of international human rights
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United States scholars have drawn particular attention to China’s re-
puted obstruction of global trade.  Fred Bergsten, of the Institute for In-
ternational Economics, writes that “China’s challenge to the existing
norms, rules, and institutions of a growing number of components of the
global economic order could be enormously disruptive both to the United
States and to world stability.”70  The use of the word “could” is key be-
cause the substantive charges leveled at China—preference for bilateral
over multilateral trade agreements and refusal to compromise on the
Doha round—apply also to the E.U., United States, and other major trad-
ing nations.71  Likewise, Professor Andrew Nathan of Columbia and Doc-
tor Andrew Scobell of RAND urge the United States “to push back
against Chinese efforts to remake global legal regimes in ways that do not
serve the interests of the West.”72  But neither article cites hard proof of
Chinese obstruction in the area of international trade.  Both Bergsten, and
Nathan and Scobell, overlook the considerable degree to which China is
already enmeshed in these same institutions, including the WTO.  China
plays a cooperative, if not especially assertive, role in the international
organizations that the West has maintained for over half a century.  The
main difference is that, now, the West must accommodate a large, in-
terventionist, illiberal, and increasingly assertive authoritarian state.
The mismatch between China’s conduct and international law reso-
nates with many political scientists.  Realists view China’s behavior in in-
ternational organizations as a way for it to reap the benefits of
membership without paying the costs.  After obtaining technical assis-
tance, thickening transnational linkages, and participating in the creation
of policy, China seeks exemptions from the organization’s normative obli-
gations and commitments to change domestic institutions.  Samuel Kim, of
Columbia, calls this the “maxi/mini principle.”73
While perhaps the most prevalent, the realist account is not the only
heuristic to explain China’s international behavior. Scholars have
deployed other interpretative lenses to observe China’s international law
engagement.74 Yet even constructivist or liberal exercises normally end
with a realist invocation of China’s national identity or national interests.
Alastair Johnston, of Harvard, differentiates “adaptation” from “learning”
instruments.  But serious problems of implementation remain in fields such as labor, discrimi-
nation, health, and gender. Id. at 709.
70. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 30
(2008) (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 15.
72. Andrew J. Nathan & Andrew Scobell, How China Sees America: The Sum of Beij-
ing’s Fears, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 32, 47 (2012).
73. Kim, supra note 9, at 419–20 (discussing China’s behavior with regard to arms
control and disarmament).
74. See, e.g., Roda Mushkat, China’s Compliance with International Law: What Has
Been Learned and the Gaps Remaining, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 41, 52–53 (2011) (noting
the realist approach has been used more than “any other analytical paradigms”).
542 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:525
in describing China’s experiences in international arms control.75  A state
“adapts” when it tactically recalculates its position vis-a`-vis the new organ-
ization, advances national interests, avoids taking on new obligations, and
broadly pursues the same foreign policy objectives as before, but in a new
arena.76  By contrast, a state “learns” when it internalizes the goals of the
international organization, shifts its understanding of policy objectives,
and conforms its behavior to these new goals.77
Professor Johnston concludes that adaptation better explains China’s
engagement with the arms control regime because China “free-rides” on
efforts of other countries, resists restraints on nuclear arms, and seeks to
dilute treaty obligations.78  China has ignored constraints on arms sales,
instead using its position in these organizations to weaken arms control.
China thus has not learned or digested the body’s norms and purposes, as
both liberal theory and constructivism would posit.
While an important indicator of China’s interaction with international
law, arms control may not broadly represent Chinese attitudes or interests.
Arms control is to some extent sui generis, tightly linked to national secur-
ity and military interests, which are not fields where international coopera-
tion blossoms.  Furthermore, the People’s Liberation Army’s control over
domestic arms production, coupled with its strong suspicion of outside in-
stitutions, limits China’s degree of engagement.79  So while arms control
may have less predictive value for a nation’s international behavior, the
lesson remains that China maximizes benefits, minimizes obligations, and
does not adjust its conduct to accommodate international norms.
A similar pattern emerges in China’s engagement with the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO).  In analyzing China’s relationship with
the ILO, Ann Kent of the Australian National University distinguishes
realist, or “instrumental,” learning from constructivist, or “cognitive,”
learning.80  She finds steady evidence of China’s instrumental learning
throughout its ILO membership.  China has actively sought technical assis-
tance and other concrete benefits, but at the same time has claimed ex-
emptions from many international legal standards.81  By 1994, after two
75. Alastair Iain Johnston, Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese
Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s, 35 CHINA J. 27, 28–29 (1996).
76. See, e.g., id. at 28.
77. The line between learning and adaptation is a fine one and may in fact reflect a
matter of degree. Learning may simply involve a “process more fundamental than adapta-
tion.” Id. at 29.  Nonetheless, the division reflects the broader debate between realists, who
maintain that states promote their own interests at all costs and in all contexts, and construc-
tivists, who believe that institutions shape and inform the strategies and behaviors of their
members.
78. Id. at 58.
79. See generally Scott W. Harold, Expanding Contacts to Enhance Durability: A Strat-
egy for Improving U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations, 16 ASIA POL. 103 (2013) (analyz-
ing recent Sino-U.S. military relations).
80. Ann Kent, China, International Organizations and Regimes: The ILO as a Case
Study in Organizational Learning, 70 PAC. AFF. 517, 521 (1997–1998).
81. Id. at 520.
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decades in the organization, China had ratified fewer than 10% of its 175
conventions.  China used the ILO primarily to advance its own interests,
and assumed none of the normative “redirections” a member state alleg-
edly undergoes.  But Kent also detects “a degree of cognitive learning” in
China’s 1995 passage of the Labor Law.82  She points to “tripartism”83 and
collective bargaining as elements that China “learned” from the ILO and
grafted into its domestic legal system.84
China’s interactivity with the ILO is instructive in another regard.
The ILO monitors labor rights in member states and investigates viola-
tions of international labor law through its Committee on the Freedom of
Association (CFA).  This sub-body has brought six cases against China,
beginning with Case 1500, an inquiry into the Tiananmen Massacre of
June 4, 1989.85  Unaware it was subject to the CFA’s jurisdiction, China
initially bristled at the request for information, stalling for over a year and
claiming exemptions from ILO norms and procedures.86  Eventually
China provided information to the committee and fulfilled its reporting
requirements.
China did not, however, implement most of the CFA’s legal recom-
mendations: ending the administrative system of re-education through la-
bor for labor activists, allowing workers to form independent trade unions,
and enshrining this right in national law and regulation.87  China went
from denial, to grudgingly providing information, and finally complying
with the ILO’s reporting requirements.  In later cases, after accepting the
reporting obligation, China communicated with the CFA on detained ac-
tivists.  China would also, on occasion, release or shorten the sentence of
activists convicted of subversion or, more precisely, establishing indepen-
82. Id. at 531–32.
83. Tripartism is the core ILO principle that governments, employers, and workers
should aim to discuss, cooperate, and formulate policies and standards. International Labour
Standards on Tripartite Consultation, INT’L LABOUR ORG., www.ilo.org/global/standards/sub
jects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/tripartite-consultation/lang—en/index.htm
(last visited May 14, 2014).
84. Kent’s optimism seems premature. The Labor Law does not mention collective
bargaining, nor a host of widely recognized international labor laws: the right to work, right
to free association (forming and joining trade unions) and the right to strike. See Kent, supra
note 80, at 530–31.
85. The Committee on the Freedom of Association (CFA) has brought six cases
against China: 1500 (June 19, 1989), 1652 (June 2, 1992), 1819 (Jan. 30, 1995), 1930 (June 4,
1997), 2031 (June 4, 1999), and 2189 (Mar. 7, 2002). It filed three complaints, on June 2 and
June 4, perhaps to commemorate the Tiananmen Massacre. Freedom of Association Cases,
INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20030:0:FIND:NO::: (last
visited May 14, 2014) (listing the cases that the CFA has brought against China).
86. Kent, supra note 80, at 527.
87. ILO WASHINGTON BRANCH OFFICE, CHINA RELATIONS WITH THE ILO 7, (Mar.
18, 2002) (Briefing Notes for U.S. Congressional – Executive China Commission Roundtable
on Labor Rights), available at http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/doc
uments/roundtables/2002/CECC%20Roundtable%20Testimony%20-%20Tony%20Freeman
%20-%203.18.02.pdf.
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dent trade unions.88  But China rarely reformed its laws and regulations to
reflect international standards.89  Kent calls Chinese engagement with the
ILO in the 1990s “a tough, unrelenting process, with ILO officials persist-
ing in the application to China of universal ILO standards against strong,
and at times vituperative, Chinese opposition.”90
Some degree of progress is detectable since Kent wrote.  After a dec-
ade of prodding,91 China amended its Trade Union Law in 2001 to recog-
nize the “right to organize or join trade unions according to law. No
organizations or individuals shall obstruct or restrict them.”92  However,
this too constitutes a form of paper compliance.  To be sure, China’s new
law made linguistic changes, including provisions described by the ILO as
“more consistent with the expressions used in international conven-
tions.”93  But the substance of the law did not change.  The Chinese gov-
ernment retained approval authority, meaning new trade unions could
only be established with official benediction.94  In practice, this has meant
no new trade unions have been established.  The revised Trade Union Law
enshrines the “right to organize,” but simultaneously allocates approval
authority to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, a subsidiary organ
of the Communist Party.95  China does not intend to tolerate “indepen-
88. Id. at 6–7.
89. Kent, supra note 80, at 528. Accord John Chen, China and the ILO, CHINA RTS. F.,
(2001), available at http://www.amrc.org.hk/alu_article/international_labour_organisation/
china_and_the_ilo (observing China’s “procedural compliance[,] . . . increased willingness to
employ [uncontroversial standards such as a minimum wage][,] . . . and a steadfast refusal to
compromise on the issue of freedom to organise and join a trade union of one’s choice”).
90. ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF
COMPLIANCE 143–44 (1999).
91. In Case 1930, the ILO requested the Chinese government amend articles 4, 5, 8, 9,
11, and 13 of the Trade Union Act and articles 79 to 83 of the Labor Law. Int’l Labour Org.
[ILO], Report in Which the Committee Requests to be Kept Informed of Development – Re-
port No. 316, Case No. 1930 (China) (June 1999), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2904319. Case 1652 like-
wise concerned the Trade Union Act and harassing labor activists. ILO, Report in Which the
Committee Requests to be Kept Informed of Development – Report No. 292, Case No. 1652
(China) (Mar. 1994) [hereinafter ILO Report No. 292], available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2902448.
92. Zhonghua Renmin Gonheguo Gonghui Fa ( ) [Trade Union
Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 1992, amended by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001), art. 3 (China), available at http://
english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/11/content_75948.htm [hereinafter Trade Union Law of 2001].
93. ILO, Effect Given to the Recommendations of the Committee and the Governing
Body – Report 324, ¶ 44, Case No. 2031 (China) (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2905299.
94. Trade Union Law of 2001, supra note 92, art. 11.
95. See id. art. 3; Trini Leung, ACFTU and Union Organizing, CHINA LABOUR BULLE-
TIN (Apr. 26, 2002), www.clb.org.hk/en/content/acftu-and-union-organizing (noting “the pri-
mary functions of ACFTU are to serve the interests of the [Communist Party] and the
policies of the government”).
Spring 2014] Paper Compliance 545
dent association” as that term is used internationally.96  Each country is, of
course, allowed a margin of appreciation to set the exact contours of its
human rights protections.  But China oversteps that boundary by harass-
ing, beating, detaining, convicting (and sometimes sentencing to death) la-
bor activists for organizing trade unions.97  This facet of China’s non-
compliance generates particular controversy.  In sum, China has not em-
braced many of the ILO’s recommendations on revising its Labor Law.98
What does this tell us about international trade?  International trade
law occupies a special niche in China and the world more broadly, reflect-
ing the lengths states go to accommodate its norms, institutions and
frameworks.  It is no accident that we have a world trade court (the DSB),
but not a world human rights court.  Trade arguably serves state interests
more readily than human rights or labor rights, and induces greater levels
of compliance.  Scholars have shown that certain disciplines—trade, secur-
ity, finance—traditionally induce higher levels of compliance than human
rights or humanitarian law.99
Various explanations account for the disparate levels of adherence.
Perhaps the most important factor lies in the fact that physical security and
economic prosperity attract more governmental attention and resources
than the well-being of the citizenry.  Human rights may trigger moral con-
cerns or spark popular outrage, but ultimately assume secondary impor-
tance when compared with the gravity of economics or national security.
Likewise, these disciplines assume higher positions on the crowded agenda
of diplomats and officials who coordinate, confer, and ultimately concoct
international law.  A second explanation involves reciprocity and calcula-
bility.  It is easier to demonstrate how one country’s violation of trade law
harms (imposes costs on) another state than it is to show how a human
rights abuse in one state affects the interests of another.
Of course, it may be unfair or unwise to use the WTO as an evaluative
yardstick for China’s compliance with international law.  First, the WTO
itself is an international organization largely constructed by, and for, de-
96. See CLB Analysis of the New Trade Union Law, CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN (Feb.
28, 2002), www.clb.org.hk/en/node/1582 (noting the revised law further entrenches the Chi-
nese government’s “monopoly on trade union activities and organising”).
97. In Case 2031, the Committee called on China to amend sections 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, and
13 of the Trade Union Act. These sections contradicted the basic principles of free associa-
tion. China reported it would revise 5, 8, and 9 to comply with international law. ILO, Effect
Given to the Recommendations of the Committee and the Governing Body – Report No. 324,
Case No. 2031 (China) (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000
:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2905299. See also CHRD Suggestions
for UPR Recommendations to China, CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS, http://chrdnet
.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/CHRD-UPR-Rec-2013-2.pdf (last visited May 14, 2014)
(noting harassment of human rights defenders).
98. For example, the CFA has requested amendments to the Labor Law to ensure the
right to strike. See ILO Report No. 292, supra note 91, ¶ 344(c). It has also requested amend-
ments to ensure collective bargaining rights. Id. ¶ 344(b).
99. Edward C. Luck, Gaps, Commitments, and the Compliance Challenge, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW & ORGANIZATION: CLOSING THE COMPLIANCE GAP 303, 309-10 (Edward C.
Luck & Michael W. Doyle eds., 2004).
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veloped Western states.100  It promotes a neoliberal economic paradigm—
low tariffs, minimal regulation, limited government subsidies, strong pro-
tection of intellectual and private property—that reflects conventional
wisdom about the role of government, circa 1995.101  Though the Great
Recession has tarnished some of neoliberalism’s sheen, norms embedded
in WTO Agreements ossify these preferences.102  For a state like China,
with a long history of official intervention in all aspects of life, from eco-
nomic activity (agriculture, manufacturing, technology, etc.) to social pol-
icy (family planning, education, social security), the neoliberal paradigm
challenges core ideas about the role of government in society.  In its con-
temporary form—a putatively communist government with a strong state-
owned presence in key industries (banking, oil, natural resource extrac-
tion, steel, telecommunications)—the Chinese state lies far outside the ne-
oliberal mandate.
Second, litigation remains foreign to Chinese legal culture.  Tradi-
tional Chinese law encouraged disputants to resolve private differences
informally, outside of officially prescribed channels.103  Likewise, on the
international level, “China prefers to use political and diplomatic methods
such as consultations and negotiations to resolve intergovernmental dis-
putes.  China’s present participation in the DSB is clearly influenced by
deeply rooted thinking and practices of traditional Chinese culture.”104
China has settled half of the cases in which it appears as a respondent,
which tracks the overall average of cases brought before the DSB.105
100. The WTO grew out of GATT 1947, an agreement initially drafted by American
and British officials in 1946. The US pushed a free trade agenda based on slashing tariffs,
minimizing export quotas, and disrupting cartels. Many of these positions were weakened
after discussions with the British. Still, the neoliberal mandate of low tariffs, light regulation,
and minimal quantitative restrictions continued to guide the development of GATT and ulti-
mately the WTO. See James Miller, Origins of the GATT – British Resistance to American
Multilateralism 2 (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. at Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 318, 2000),
available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp318.pdf.
101. See Elaine Hartwick & Richard Peet, Neoliberalism and Nature: The Case of the
WTO, 590 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 188, 190-92 (2003) (describing the ne-
oliberal agenda of the Uruguay Round, which led ultimately to the 1995 founding of the
WTO).
102. For a timely critique of neoliberal economic policy, see generally JOSEPH E. STIG-
LITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2012) (describing how U.S. economic policy has led to
vastly unequal wealth distribution, and how these policies have spread around the world, at
least in part through such U.S.-backed institutions as the IMF and WTO).
103. JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY 185 (2d ed.,
2006) (noting that private conflicts were resolved through customary and nonofficial chan-
nels, such as craft or merchant guilds, neighborhood associations, village elders, or clan orga-
nizations). A more recent campaign by the Chinese government has also pushed private
litigants out of formal civil litigation and into informal mediation. See generally Carl F.
Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011).
104. MAO YANJING, WTO ZHENGDUAN JIEJUE JIZHI WENTI YU GAIGE [DRAWBACKS
AND REFORMATION OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM] 230 (2010).
105. Kara M. Reynolds, Why Are So Many WTO Disputes Abandoned?, in TRADE DIS-
PUTES & THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO: AN INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY ASSESSMENT 191, 198 (James C. Hartigan ed., 2009) (noting that 48.8% of cases
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While traditional mores may influence China’s repeated decisions to settle
early, other factors—including its lack of experience with WTO and
GATT litigation—may also help explain this tendency.106
Third, the preference for formal adjudication benefits common law
countries, such as the United States, to the direct detriment of member
states outside of this tradition, such as China.  Scholars trace the “highly
contextualized, case-specific approach” of WTO dispute resolution back
to United States dominance in treaty negotiations.107  The inclination to-
wards adversarialism likewise privileges United States legal culture, con-
ferring a comparative advantage both in terms of the larger number of
lawyers and firms that practice international trade law, and the practical
and clinical training that students receive in law school.  To the extent that
better-trained lawyers, deploying tools familiar from practice and educa-
tion, help the United States advance its cause, states like China compete at
a significant disadvantage.  The United States has brought the largest
number of disputes against China, taking full advantage of its legal culture.
Beyond reasons specific to China, other factors caution prudence in
viewing DSB implementation as a reliable index of a member’s adherence
to international law.  The high success rate for complainants, between 83%
and 91% by one estimate, has invited doubts about the objectivity of the
DSB’s adjudicative processes.108  The DSB is overwhelmingly likely to
find a WTO violation against any member.  This is true whether the re-
spondent is China (subject of a few dozen complaints, ten of which have
concluded) or a more seasoned WTO litigator such as the United States or
E.U.109
China’s international interactions in the areas of labor, arms control,
and human rights are instructive.  They evidence a reluctant interlocutor
and loath participant in international organizations.  To the extent China
complies, it is largely discursive rather than digestive, focusing on words
(reporting, discussing) rather than deeds (changing laws or behaviors).
China’s compliance with the WTO has exceeded its performance in other
brought during the WTO era have settled, including 33% which have no further action,
13.3% which settle before a panel is established, and 2.5% which are withdrawn).
106. See Henry Gao, The Elephant in the Room: Challenges of Integrating China into the
WTO System, 6 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 137, 145 (2011). The WTO, and
GATT before it, has provided dispute settlement procedures since 1948. China, however,
only joined the WTO in 2001. See Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: Early Dispute Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 158, 163 (2000) (noting that approximately 52% of cases (155 of 298) brought during the
before-GATT era settled).
107. JOSEPH A. CONTI, BETWEEN LAW AND DEMOCRACY: THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF
DISPUTING AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 60 (2011).
108. See Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From Empirical Analy-
sis to Biased Rule Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 383, 439 (2009) (attributing the
83% to 91% success rate of WTO complainants to decision-makers that both curtail respon-
dents’ substantive rights and create new obligations).
109. Both the United States. and E.U. have been the subject of scores of disputes.
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legal regimes.110  Yet as we will see in Part IV, China still refuses a broad
patch of the WTO disciplines.
III. CHINA IN THE WTO
China’s accession to the WTO was epochal.111  One of the largest and
most dynamic economies would finally “join the world,” or rushi as the
Chinese say.112  The accession was widely expected to boost international
trade, encourage China’s restructuring towards a market economy, and
discipline China’s domestic legal system.113
Many welcomed China’s entry into the WTO.  President Clinton be-
lieved China’s accession represented “a good agreement for China and for
America and for the world.  I think that all of us benefit when the most
populous nation in the world is . . . part of a rule-based system that will
110. Kent contrasts China’s “acceptance of more intense foreign and international scru-
tiny” from the WTO with its “lack of cooperation on issues of transparency and verification”
in organizations such as the International Labor Organization, International Monetary Fund,
United Nations Environment Program, and United Nations Committee against Torture. See
KENT, supra note 11, at 238.
111. See China Officially Joins WTO, CNN (Nov. 11, 2001, 1:17 AM), http://edition.cnn
.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/11/10/china.WTO/ (featuring encomium from prominent
officials, such as the U.S. trade representative, French finance minister, Nigerian trade minis-
ter, and WTO Director-General Mike Moore, who deemed China’s accession a “major his-
toric event”).
112. When China joined the WTO in 2001, it was the sixth largest economy in world,
slightly smaller than France. World’s Largest Economies, CNN, http://money.cnn.com/news/
economy/world_economies_gdp (last visited May. 14, 2014). Prior to joining the WTO, in
2000, “China was the [seventh] leading exporter and [eighth] largest importer of merchandise
trade.” Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on
China’s Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), available at www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e
.htm. The Chinese economy has grown at an average rate of 10% for thirty years. Many
analysts currently see slow growth in the immediate future. See Damian Grammaticas, China
Growth Shows Signs of Pick-up from 13-year Low, BBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2013, 3:07 AM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-21071546.
113. At the time of China’s accession, in December 2001, the WTO had 144 member-
states. By joining the WTO, each state accedes to the compulsory jurisdiction of the WTO’s
dispute settlement body. Other international tribunals, such as the International Court of
Justice, have fewer members that accept compulsory jurisdiction. See Int’l Court of Justice,
Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, ICJ-CIJ.ORG, www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited May 14, 2014) (listing 70 mem-
bers). The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, which had 139 mem-
ber states in 2001, does not require member states to submit to its jurisdiction. Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, pmbl.,
Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 (“[N]o Contracting State shall by the mere fact of its ratifica-
tion . . . of this Convention . . . be deemed to be under any obligation to submit any particular
dispute to conciliation or arbitration.”). Finally, the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea has compulsory jurisdiction over all 166 member states in treaty interpretation and other
matters provided by agreement. See The Tribunal, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE
SEA, http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15 (last visited May 14, 2014).
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bring shared prosperity.”114  Many in the business community, academia,
and government likewise expressed genuine, if guarded, optimism.
But others doubted the depth of China’s commitment.  Some sus-
pected China would not, indeed could not, withstand WTO obligations on
market access, transparency, IP, or subsidies.115  Several cases in the DSB
have focused on these very issues, suggesting that China’s accession to the
WTO did not resolve all of them.  Still others questioned whether China
would abide by DSB rulings; an unfavorable decision might force China to
revise its domestic laws, a clear infringement of its jealously-guarded sov-
ereignty.116  Given China’s resistance to revising its labor laws and re-
specting arms control treaties, such doubts were well taken.  One
commentator expressed concern, due to China’s broad inconsistency with
WTO disciplines, that the ensuing flood of disputes against China would
simply overwhelm the DSB.117
For its part, China has invested considerable resources in joining the
WTO, accepting the most onerous requirements placed on any member to
join the organization in the first place.118  The WTO houses one of three
major tribunals to which China presently submits to binding international
adjudication, and the only one where cases have been brought against.119
Given China’s reluctance to cede sovereignty to international institutions,
and adjudicatory institutions in particular, China’s behavior in the WTO is
vital to understanding its role as an international legal actor, and in global
governance regimes more generally.
A. Mechanics of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
The inclusion of the Dispute Settlement Body into the World Trade
Organization marked a major, if not the major, difference between the old
GATT system and the new WTO.120  By incorporating substantive law,
dispute settlement procedures, and an adjudicatory body into one system,
the WTO would “overcome the legal and procedural fragmentation of the
114. Remarks Following Discussions with President Suleyman Demirel of Turkey and
an Exchange with Reporters in Ankara, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 46 (Nov. 22, 1999),
available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1999-11-22/html/WCPD-1999-11-22-Pg2378.htm.
115. See China’s Accession to the WTO: Ready and Willing . . . But Able?, CHINA LAW
& PRACTICE, Jan. 1, 2002, sec. 22, available at 2002 WLNR 15139677.
116. Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China’s Capacity to Implement World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 399, 449 (2002) (citing badly drafted laws and diffuse governmental authority as inter-
nal challenges to China’s DSB compliance).
117. Sylvia Ostry, WTO Membership for China: To Be and Not To Be: Is That the An-
swer?, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 31,
37 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003).
118. See Qin, supra note 60, at 521 (describing the obligations placed on China’s acces-
sion as “unique in scope and scale”).
119. Julian Ku, China and the Future of International Adjudication, 27 MD. J. INT’L L.
154, 156 (2012).
120. John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and a New Round, in THE WTO AFTER SEAT-
TLE 269, 269 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000).
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old ‘GATT a` la carte’ system.”121  Under the old GATT system, members
could (a) prevent the dispute from being adjudicated in the first place, (b)
object to the adoption of the report as prepared by independent experts,
or (c) refuse the authorization of countermeasures.122  The WTO formal-
ized a procedure, with the possibility of sanctions, by which members may
challenge the laws and regulations of any other member state, even with-
out that state’s permission.
At the beginning of the dispute settlement process, the parties engage
in consultation to see if they can resolve the dispute without formal litiga-
tion.123  If the dispute is not resolved in the consultation phase, a panel of
three independent trade experts will convene.124  The panel then conducts
a highly fact-intensive inquiry and ultimately produces a report that can
stretch to several hundred pages.  Even then, there is no guarantee that
the DSB will find a violation, although it typically does.  Panel reports
often exercise “judicial economy” with regard to certain legal claims, es-
sentially dodging the question of a violation.  An appeal may then follow.
Finally, assuming a violation is found and the party exercises its right to
appeal, the Appellate Body (AB) will then take perhaps another year to
review the panel’s findings.  After the AB renders a final decision, the
DSB will adopt the report, which then becomes binding upon the parties.
The respondent country may reform its domestic legal system to accom-
modate the ruling, or ignore the ruling and accept sanctions (compensa-
tion or retaliation) in lieu of changing its domestic legal system.  It is not
unusual for a case to take five to seven years from the initial investigation
to the conclusion.
Upon finding a violation, the DSB recommends that the offending
member “bring the measure into conformity with [the WTO] agree-
ment.”125  This happens in one of three ways.  First, and optimally, the
member withdraws the offending measure.  The member can request a
“reasonable period of time” in which to implement the ruling when it is
“impracticable to comply immediately.”126  The result is that the world
trading system suffers one fewer distortive law or measure; no attempt to
compensate for the damage done by the inconsistent measure is made.
Second, when immediate withdrawal is impracticable, the DSB can
order compensation, which eases the financial burden imposed when the
121. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 202
(1997).
122. See generally Historic Development of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c2s1p1_e.htm (last vis-
ited on May 14, 2014).
123. Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes art. 4(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU].
124. Id. arts. 4(7), 8(5).
125. Id. art. 19(1).
126. Id. art. 21(3).
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losing party prolongs the inconsistent measure.  The losing party lifts trade
barriers on certain imported products to compensate for the losses, by
lowering tariff rates on imports from the prevailing country.127  In reality,
compensation is rarely chosen.128
Third, the DSB can authorize retaliation, whereby the prevailing party
can suspend trade concessions to the losing party.  Normally, this means
that the prevailing party can raise tariffs on imports from the losing party,
in an amount equivalent to the losses incurred by prolonging the inconsis-
tent measure.129  Often the prevailing country will retaliate in the same
sector as the dispute: if the dispute centers on subsidies to goods, the retal-
iatory measure will target similar goods.130  Or the WTO may authorize
sanctions on similar products in the same sector.131  But the WTO has also
authorized states to retaliate across sectors, as in the recent dispute be-
tween the United States and Antigua.132  The DSB calculates the approxi-
127. Whether only the prevailing party can obtain compensation, or whether all WTO
members can obtain compensation by virtue of the WTO’s principle of nondiscrimination,
remains a theoretical dispute. See Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement & Countermeasures in the
WTO: Rules Are Rules, Toward A More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 337
(2000) (relying on an early WTO DSB ruling to posit that all WTO members can avail them-
selves of compensation).
128. William J. Davey, Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement: What Results Have Been
Achieved Through Consultations and Implementation of Panel Reports?, in THE WTO IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, AND REGIONALISM IN
ASIA 98, 138 (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al. eds., 2007) (noting compensation has not often been
used).
129. DSU, supra note 123, art. 22(4).
130. When the E.U. lost the Beef Hormone Dispute, the Appellate Body authorized
the United States and Canada to impose tariffs on European foodstuffs. Canada imposed 100
percent duties on C$11 million worth of European meats. EU, Canada Move to End Long
Hormone Beef Row, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 20, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/
health-and-families/eu-canada-move-to-end-long-hormone-beef-row-2247711.html. The
United States took a more catholic approach, imposing a 100% duty on a variety of products
from E.U. members, such as pork, onions, Roquefort cheese, fruit juice, coffee, and mustard.
Implementation of WTO Recommendations Concerning E.C.-Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), 64 Fed. Reg. 40638 (July 27, 1999). The annex lists the vari-
ous products. Id. Negotiations continued until 2009, when the E.U. additionally agreed to
eliminate tariffs on U.S. high-quality beef for four years (20,000 tons per year for three years,
45,000 tons in the fourth year). See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., USTR
Announces Agreement with European Union in Beef Hormones Dispute (May 13, 2009),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/may/ustr-announ
ces-agreement-european-union-beef-hormones-.
131. See Phoenix X.F. Cai, Making WTO Remedies Work for Developing Nations: The
Need for Class Actions, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 151, 173 (2011).
132. In 2007, the Appellate Body determined that U.S. law (state and federal) blocking
online gambling violated GATS. Because Antigua and Barbuda had little to gain through
sanctions against the United States in the services sector, the DSB authorized Antigua and
Barbuda to suspend concessions in various forms of intellectual property. See Press Release,
Government of Antigua and Barbuda, Antigua to Pursue Sanctions against the United States
in Decade-Long Trade Dispute (Jan. 28, 2013), available at http://ab.gov.ag/article_details.php
?id=3846&category=38.
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mate harm and then “charges” the offending nation an equivalent amount
of trade in goods, services, or intellectual property appropriation.
Some question whether a WTO violation actually amounts to a breach
of international law.  Indeed, one could ask whether the WTO is itself an
appropriate forum for studying compliance in the first place.  To be sure,
infringing WTO disciplines lacks the urgency of a war crime, torture or
genocide; no one dies from illegal subsidiesor loses blood from intellectual
property theft.  Certain U.S. scholars have expressed the belief that the
WTO merely comprises “instrumental law . . . only worthy of compliance
to the extent that compliance makes people better off.  It thus seems at-
tractive to allow states the flexibility to ‘buy’ their way out of at least some
kinds of obligations by [compensating] other states.”133  Such skepticism is
grounded in “efficient breach” theory, which stipulates that party A up-
holds contractual obligations to party B only to the extent that it is less
expensive (“efficient”) than breaching the contract and paying damages.
If A’s interest is better served by breaching the agreement, selling the
goods at a higher price to C, and paying compensation to B, A should do
so.134
While international law certainly is instrumental, that does not make
its obligations any less binding.  Some scholars argue that the WTO agree-
ments, and DSB rulings in particular, constitute binding international
law.135  Support for this notion can be found sprinkled throughout the
provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,136 as well as subse-
quent reports from the DSB.137  Furthermore, the strong implementation
record by member states suggests, by and large, that members act as if
bound by DSB rulings.138  At this point, a broad swath of academic litera-
ture now supports the idea that WTO and DSB rulings constitute binding
international law.139
133. Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 127, 130 (2007).
134. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56 (1972).
135. John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings
on the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 60, 63–64 (1997) (noting that WTO
rules are binding in the international legal sense of having domestic legal effect).
136. Jackson acknowledges that the “the language of the DSU does not solidly ‘nail
down’ this issue.” Id. at 62. Yet he does cite eleven clauses in the DSU that strongly support
the notion that DSB recommendations are binding. Id. at 63.
137. Pauwelyn, supra note 127, at 341.
138. See, e.g., Mitsuo Matsushita, Some Issues in Implementing DSB Recommendations,
4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 293, 295 (2009) (stating that most decisions
result in compliance and only a “handful” of cases result in non-compliance); Wilson, supra
note 36 (noting that in “virtually all” cases where the DSB has found a violation, the member
state has complied with the recommendation).
139. See, e.g., Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How it Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L
L. 1, 13 (2010) (“The WTO agreements are legally binding on all member states. If a WTO
member violates its obligations, the WTO can authorize trade retaliation measures and hold
states accountable through the DSM. The enforceability of WTO agreements challenges the
common view that international law is always ‘soft’ and compliance with it voluntary.”); Joost
Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2005) (“Unlike
GATT Article XXIII, which focused on maintaining a mere balance of concessions, the
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B. China’s Record in the WTO
Amidst a cacophony of divergent perspectives, however, one keynote
emerges.  Observers consistently claim that China’s WTO compliance is,
on the whole, “mixed.”140  They invariably praise its bold steps to imple-
ment parts of the WTO mandate: lowering tariffs, improving market ac-
cess (i.e., opening its domestic market to foreign products), and increasing
rule-based judicial adjudication.  But commentators also criticize China’s
lack of transparency, weak intellectual property protection, and embrace
of state capitalism.  For example, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) oversees twenty federal agencies to monitor China’s WTO com-
pliance;141 its annual evaluation of China’s WTO compliance has been pe-
rennially mixed or, in the bureaucratic vernacular, “complex.”142  After
customarily complimenting China’s “many impressive steps to implement
a set of sweeping commitments,”143 the USTR catalogs areas where China
has failed to discharge its WTO obligations: obstructing market access for
foreign goods and companies, subsidizing industries, poorly enforcing in-
tellectual property rights, and so on.144  Of course, the USTR expressed
these concerns long before China acceded to the WTO, going back well
into the 1990s.145
The United States, one of China’s leading economic competitors, is
hardly a disinterested observer of China’s conduct.  But the United States
is not alone in criticizing China’s compliance record.  The WTO Secreta-
riat has also enumerated many gaps between WTO requirements and
China’s domestic legal and regulatory systems, in areas such as trans-
parency, technical barriers, sanitary measures, and export quotas.146  In its
biennial reviews, the WTO has raised questions about China’s export re-
DSU . . . imposes a legally binding obligation to comply with WTO rules and WTO dispute
rulings.”). But the idea continues to have its detractors. See Marco Dani, European Legal
Pluralism: The Fiamm and Fedon Litigation and the Judicial Protection of International Trade
Systems, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 303, 330 (2010) (“[E]ven when the Appellate Body suggests ways
to implement the DSB recommendations, such suggestions are not binding on the losing
party.”).
140. Feinerman, supra note 61, at 210.
141. Gerald Chan, China & The WTO: The Theory & Practice of Compliance 12 (Royal
Inst. of Int’l Affairs, Asia Program, Working Paper No. 5, 2003) (describing the U.S. govern-
ment effort as the largest monitoring mechanism of any trade agreement).
142. U.S. TRADE REP., 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 2
(2011) (“[T]he overall picture currently presented by China’s WTO membership remains
complex.”).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2–3. Similar concerns appear in previous reports. See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REP.,
2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 6–8 (2007).
145. Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 1469, 1485–86 (2000).
146. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review – China 2012, ¶¶ 7, 9, 12, WT/TPR/S/264
(May 8, 2012).
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strictions on natural resources, obstacles to foreign direct investment, and
market barriers to services.147
The USTR reports and WTO reviews do not necessarily prove a viola-
tion of WTO law.  Proper determination of a WTO violation usually re-
quires an enormous expenditure of time, resources and perseverance.  The
complaining state must conduct its own investigation, even though it may
rely on private organizations, such as multinational corporations or public
interest groups, to furnish specific information about trade barriers.148
The complainant must then coordinate information flows from private ac-
tors and government agencies, formulate legal arguments based on these
findings, and prepare extensive findings to proceed in its case.  It then
heads to Geneva for consultations.
IV. REVIEW OF THE CASES
It is easy to charge a country with violating international trade law;
politicians do it often.  But because the WTO adjudicative process is fact-
intensive, proving a violation poses a far more serious challenge.  This sec-
tion examines the legislative and regulatory reforms that China has made,
as well as those it has not made, to comply with DSB rulings and recom-
mendations.  Disputes currently before the DSB exceed the scope of this
inquiry.149  Likewise, violations of WTO law brought before domestic au-
thorities for adjudication lie outside this inquiry.150
Trade scholars use two factors to determine whether a member has
complied with a ruling.151  First, the timeliness inquiry asks whether the
147. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review – China 2010, ¶¶ 16, 19, 20, WT/TPR/S/230
(Apr. 26, 2010).
148. See, e.g., China – Grants, Loans, and Other Incentives, WTO, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds387_e.htm (DSB 387). In this case, U.S. companies pro-
vided information to the U.S. Trade Representative about allegedly inconsistent local and
provincial regulations. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative,
United States Wins End to China’s “Famous Brand” Subsidies after Challenge at WTO;
Agreement Levels Playing Field for American Workers in Every Manufacturing Sector (Dec.
18, 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/decem-
ber/united-states-wins-end-china’s-”famous-brand”-sub.
149. Several disputes are ongoing. See, e.g., China – Measures Concerning Wind Power
Equipment, WT/DS419/1 (Jan. 6, 2011).
150. Domestic adjudicative bodies, such as the International Trade Administration and
International Trade Commission in the United States, interpret U.S. domestic law to deter-
mine whether there has been a violation of U.S. statutory law, and hence whether a duty
should be imposed. With respect to China, the United States has imposed anti-dumping du-
ties in 61 of the 71 investigations brought. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jared C. Woollacott,
Trade Disputes Between China and the United States: Growing Pains So Far, Worse Ahead?, 3
EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 31, 51 (2012). China has challenged these investigations in three
WTO disputes, proffering colorable claims that some of these duties may have violated WTO
law.
151. See William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 COR-
NELL INT’L L.J. 119, 119 (2009). A third factor is potentially salient in disputes against China.
Namely, did China violate WTO agreements (generally applicable international law) or the
China Accession Protocol or Working Party Report (China-specific international law)? The
distinction is important because international law is supposedly a neutral set of general prin-
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member implements the ruling within a “reasonable period of time.”152
The parties to the dispute determine the period of time, meaning an im-
portant part of the inquiry lies within the member’s power.  Unless the
parties agree otherwise, the reasonable period of time should not exceed
fifteen months.153 The problem with this inquiry is that it reduces compli-
ance to a single metric.  Since most members implement rulings in a timely
manner, and developing states do, on average, a better job than developed
states, timeliness is an insufficient gauge of compliance on its own.154
The second factor, quality, examines how the member actually imple-
mented the ruling.  What laws did it change?  What laws did it leave in
place?  Did it rescind the offending measure or revise it?155  If it refuses to
change, did the DSB authorize compensation or retaliation?  Did the
member state retaliate?  Or did the state modify the measure, but in a way
that does not address the DSB’s concern?156  The quality inquiry ad-
dresses the heavy lifting of compliance: the domestic legal, administrative
ciples binding on all states. ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (2d
ed., 2010). Yet the profusion of China-specific commitments belies the notion that interna-
tional law proscribes equal treatment, and requires equal commitments, from all member
states. Scholars describe the Accession Protocol as containing “WTO-plus obligations,”
which impose more stringent disciplines on China than on other members, and “WTO-minus
obligations,” which reduce China’s rights as a WTO member. For a compelling analysis, see
Qin, supra note 60, at 490. The China-specific commitments are myriad, and include, inter
alia, market access for both goods and services, freezing tariff rates, translating trade regula-
tions into a WTO language (which no other member must do), prompt administrative review
of trade matters in Chinese tribunals, and designation as a non-market economy (which
makes it easier for WTO members to bring and win anti-dumping cases). See id. at 488–91.
152. The WTO prescribes three methods to determine what a reasonable period is.
First, the DSB can set the period after the offending member proposes a course of action.
Second, the parties themselves may set the period. Third, if the parties go to binding arbitra-
tion after adopting the recommendations, the period should not exceed fifteen months from
the date of the adoption of the report. DSU, supra note 123, art. 21(3).
153. Id. art. 21(4).
154. Davey finds that developed countries timely comply in 50% of cases, whereas de-
veloping countries timely comply in 80% of cases. Davey, supra note 128, at 138.
155. For example, the U.S. has chosen not to repeal Section 211 of the Omnibus Appro-
priations Act, which the DSB determined violated the national treatment obligation of the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS] Agreement in
2001. The United States told the DSB that it had “been working for more than ten years on
the implementation of the DSB’s recommendations in this dispute,” but has not amended the
law. Countries—including China—have routinely urged the United States to comply with the
ruling. See, e.g., World Trade Org. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, ¶¶ 22–33,
WT/DSB/M/316 (July 20, 2012) (noting the urging of twelve countries).
156. For instance, in United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”,
the U.S. revised laws that tax foreign corporations to comply with a previous DSB decision.
But the European Communities (“EC”) believed that the revised law continued the viola-
tions and requested a compliance proceeding, which found that the revised law was still in-
consistent with the decision. Recourse by the European Communities to Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement and Article 22.7 of the DSU, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign
Sales Corporations”, WTO/DSB108/26 (Apr. 25, 2003). For a summary of the case, see United
States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds108_e.htm (last visited May 14, 2014).
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and regulatory changes needed to discharge obligations under interna-
tional law.
The DSB has resolved eight cases against China.  In four disputes that
went to final adjudication, the DSB found Chinese law violated WTO dis-
ciplines.  In four disputes that settled, China agreed that some measures
likewise violated WTO law.  All eight cases found Chinese law to be in-
consistent.  The more interesting story is that, in five of the eight cases,
China has revised laws, withdrawn measures and essentially addressed the
complaining parties’ concerns.157  In the language of the two factors iden-
tified above, China achieved qualitatively sound compliance in a reasona-
ble period of time.  China revised its inconsistent measures so as to
effectuate the DSB ruling, and thus achieve “paper compliance.”  But that
does not capture the whole story.
In the three cases analyzed below, China has either failed to annul all
inconsistent measures, or has revised them in questionable ways.  In its
worst performance—and it is worth stressing that China’s non-compliance
is mild by comparative standards158—China neither abided by the reason-
able period of time, nor annulled three (of eighteen) provisions that the
DSB found inconsistent with WTO agreements.159  In another case, China
revised a regulation to perpetuate the harm initially challenged.  This is
the obverse, but equally important, side of paper compliance: small but
significant tweaks to the revised legislation that neutralize parts of the rul-
ing’s intrusiveness.  The following section examines three cases where
China’s implementation of DSB rulings has been inadequate.
Apart from the issue of domestic implementation, the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) has its own compliance procedures.  It
is significant that in two cases, China did not submit a status report or
notify the Dispute Settlement Body of outstanding compliance issues, as it
must under the DSU.160  Instead of putting the implementation issue on
the agenda, China stated it “was glad to declare that it had brought its
measures into conformity with the DSB’s recommendations and rul-
ings.”161  But other members complained that China had violated proce-
dure by failing to circulate an implementation report.162  China argued
that the “closing date” to submit items for the agenda was August 20,
157. See infra App. 1 (listing outcomes for several cases).
158. For instance, the DSB has yet to authorize sanctions against China for failing to
implement a decision. The DSB has done so, however, against both the E.U. and United
States. See, e.g., World Trade Org. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, ¶ 90, WT/
DSB/M/273 (Nov. 6, 2009) [hereinafter November 6 Minutes]; id. ¶¶ 2-14 (listing members’
comments on the United States’ failure to implement the DSB’s ruling and recommendations
in U.S. – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998); id. ¶ 19 (listing Japan’s concerns
about the United States’ partial implementation of the DSB’s ruling and recommendation in
U.S. – Anti-dumping measures); id. ¶ 23 (listing the E.C.’s concerns about United States’
“non-compliance” in U.S. – Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act).
159. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
160. DSU, supra note 123, art. 21(6).
161. November 6 Minutes, supra note 158, ¶ 90.
162. Id. ¶¶ 86–88.
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2009—seven days prior to the August 27 deadline set by the DSU.  China
thus believed it need not place the implementation issue on the August 31
DSB meeting.
But its argument is unpersuasive.  The DSU says nothing about a clos-
ing date for agenda submissions.  China was obligated to place the issue on
the agenda, even if such placement required action before the August 27
deadline.  China knew of the August 31 meeting and could easily have
submitted the issue to the DSB meeting agenda in a timely manner.  China
should have also provided the status report as required by the DSU.  In-
ternational law imposes on all member states a good faith requirement to
implement treaty provisions.163  While a procedural peccadillo in the
grand scheme of things, China’s failure to report suggests it is testing insti-
tutional boundaries and determining what forms of compliance are abso-
lutely necessary.
A. Protection and Enforcement of IPR (DSB 362, April 2007)
The enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) perennially gen-
erates tension in U.S.-China relations.  U.S. visitors to Beijing are stunned
to find malls, such as the Silk Market, stocked with knock-off goods of
their favorite brands.164  Back in the United States, however, observers
lament the rampancy of Chinese piracy, as they have for decades, if not
longer.165  Despite repeated expressions of concern, the United States has
made little progress towards prodding China to protect IPR more ro-
bustly.  This case asked whether the DSB might provide relief.166
The United States challenged three aspects of China’s IP regulatory
scheme: (1) the unavailability of copyright protection for works not au-
163. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
164. See Will China Protect Intellectual Property? New Developments in Counterfeiting,
Piracy, and Forged Technology: Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm. on China, 111th
Cong. (2010) (statement of Greg Frazier, Executive Vice President, Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America) (describing both the Silk Market and a store across the street where, despite
three raids by Chinese authorities, one could still enter “a back room with virtually any pi-
rated DVD [one] could want”), available at http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house
.gov/files/documents/hearings/2010/CECC%20Hearing%20Testimony%20-%20Greg%20Fra
zier%20-%209.22.10.pdf.
165. China’s last empire, the Qing, introduced the country’s first trademark regulation
in 1904 and the first copyright law in 1910. See JIANQIANG NIE, THE ENFORCEMENT OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 179 (2006). Both laws were enacted in response to
foreign pressure, applied in particular by Japan, the United States, and the U.K. Id. See also
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE 36-37 (1995).
166. Most commentators agree that the United States did not achieve enhanced protec-
tion of IPR rights through this case. See, e.g., Rogier Creemers, The Effects of World Trade
Organization Case DS362 on Audiovisual Media Piracy in China, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 568, 575 (2009); Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046,
1083 (2011) (“For intellectual property rights holders, the most important question is . . .
whether the resolution of this dispute would lead to substantive improvements in intellectual
property protection and enforcement in China. The answer, unfortunately, is mostly
negative.”).
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thorized for publication; (2) the disposal methods for counterfeit goods;
and (3) the threshold of infringement necessary to initiate criminal pro-
ceedings under Chinese law.167  In its ruling, the panel found for the
United States on the first and second claims, but not the third.  First, under
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), a
member state may prohibit the publication or distribution of certain
works, but it cannot deny them copyright protection.168  But China’s Cop-
yright Law specifically denied copyright protection to works whose publi-
cation or dissemination was prohibited by law.169 Accordingly, the panel
found that the unavailability of copyright protection under Chinese law,
even to books it banned or censored, breached its obligations under
TRIPS.170
Second, the panel held that Chinese customs regulations also violated
TRIPS.171  Chinese customs authorities permitted counterfeit goods to re-
enter the stream of commerce once the infringing elements had been re-
moved.172  In practice, that meant sellers of counterfeit goods could
remove the alligator from a fake Lacoste shirt and then donate it to char-
ity, sell it back to the manufacturer, or auction it off at a public sale.  The
panel found selling the product after simply removing the infringing trade-
mark inconsistent with TRIPS.173
The United States failed on its third claim, that China’s criminal
threshold for trademark or copyright infringement exceeded levels permis-
sible under TRIPS.174  The DSB determined that the United States had
not satisfied its burden of proof to show that China’s methods of calculat-
ing thresholds—which in fact were quite complicated—effectively shielded
167. Request for Consultations by the United States, China – Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶¶ 1-3, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16,
2007).
168. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 9(1),
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
169. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa ( )
[Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990), art. 4.
170. Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, ¶ 7.181, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter DS362 January
Panel Report].
171. Id. ¶ 7.395(c). The Customs Measures in fact refer to three different measures, but
each deals with the disposal of infringing goods. Id. ¶ 7.196. Moreover, the panel only found
that one of them, discussed below, actually violated TRIPS.
172. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhishi Chanquan Haiguan Baohu Tiaoli
( ) [Regulations on Customs Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights] (promulgated by State Council of People’s Rep. of China, Dec. 2, 2003,
effective on Mar. 1, 2004), art. 27.
173. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 168, art. 46 (“[T]he simple removal of the trade-
mark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient . . . to permit release of the goods into the
channels of commerce.”) The Panel found that China’s customs regulations allowed confis-
cated goods to be auctioned off once the infringing content had been removed. See also,
DS362 January Panel Report, supra note 170, ¶ 8.1(b)(iii).
174. Id., ¶ 7.681.
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violators of IPR from criminal prosecution.  Neither China nor the United
States appealed the ruling, and China informed the DSB that it would
implement the ruling within twelve months, by March 20, 2010.175
Following the panel’s ruling, China agreed to amend both its Copy-
right Law and the relevant customs regulations.176  First, on February 26,
2010, the National People’s Congress promulgated a revised Copyright
Law, removing the denial of copyright protection to prohibited works.177
According to one observer, this was the only amendment to the Copyright
Law.178  Yet the amendment did not dramatically alter the Copyright Law.
Before the WTO case, Article 4 read “Works the publication or dissemina-
tion of which is prohibited by law shall not be protected by this Law.  Cop-
yright owners, in exercising their copyright, shall not violate the
Constitution or laws or prejudice the public interest.”179  After the WTO
case, China revised the law to state, “[c]opyright holders shall not violate
the Constitution or laws or jeopardize public interests when exercising
their copyright. The State shall supervise and administrate the publication
and dissemination of works in accordance with the law.”180  China deleted
the first sentence, kept the second sentence (now the first sentence of new
Article 4) and added another sentence.  The revisions halt the TRIPS’s
inconsistent practice of denying copyright protection to prohibited works.
A copyright holder can, at least under international law, enjoy protection
for his works, even if prohibited by domestic law.  But the newly revised
law continues to empower the state to decide what to publish and dissemi-
nate; it also positively grants copyright protection to prohibited or cen-
sored works.181
175. Communication from China and the United States Concerning Article 21.3(b) of
the DSU, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, WT/DS/362/13 (July 3, 2009).
176. See Status Report by China, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and En-
forcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/14 (Jan. 8, 2010) (noting the amended
law and regulations had been submitted to the State Council for consideration).
177. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa ( )
[Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, revised by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 26,
2010), art. 4.
178. See Hong Xue, A User-Unfriendly Draft: 3rd Revision of the Chinese Copyright
Law, INFOJUSTICE 1, http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/hongxue042012.pdf
(last visited May 14, 2014)(explaining that the sole revision in the amended law was to ad-
dress the WTO concern).
179. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa ( ) [Copy-
right Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990), art. 4.
180. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa ( ) [Copy-
right Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, revised by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 26,
2010), art. 4.
181. Admittedly, it would be odd for a law to grant copyright protection to a work it
bans. Yet given the large number of works banned in China, and the number of works freely
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Second, on March 17, 2010—two days before the reasonable period of
time expired—the State Council issued a revised set of customs regula-
tions.182  The new regulations addressed the concern about reintroducing
counterfeit goods back into the channels of commerce by inserting one
provision into Article 27: “[B]ut imported goods bearing a counterfeit
trademark shall not, except in special circumstances, be permitted to enter
the stream of commerce upon merely removing the trademark from the
goods.”183
At first blush, the revised regulation prevents counterfeit goods from
reentering the channels of commerce, and thus addresses the United
States’ concerns.  But a closer reading suggests otherwise.  The provision
only applies to imported counterfeit goods: ones produced outside of
China and then imported into China.  The qualifier “imported” narrows
the article’s scope and applicability: it does not cover counterfeits pro-
duced in China.  Since China is the world’s largest producer of counterfeit
goods, restricting the article’s scope to imported counterfeit products
seems misplaced.184
Moreover, it is bewildering that the revised regulations include the
word “imported” at all.  It does not elsewhere appear in Article 27, which
deals with the disposal of counterfeit goods, not imports.185  The only
flowing through underground channels, some positive grant of copyright protection would
make clear that Chinese law adhered to TRIPS.
182. See Guowuyuan Guanyu xiugai <Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhishi Chanquan
Haiguan Baohu Tiaoli> de Jueding (Quanwen)
( ) [State Council
Decision Concerning Revisions to the “Regulations on Customs Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights of the PRC” (Complete)] (promulgated Mar. 17, 2010, effective Mar. 24,
2010) (China) (noting that the State Council Standing Committee passed the measures on
March 17, 2010, and they become effective on April 1, 2010). An English summary of the
revisions is also available. See The State Council Decided to Amend IPR Customs Protection
Regulations, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA (Mar. 30, 2010 11:35:32 AM),
http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/ lawsarticle/laws/lawsar/others/201003/ 632083_1.html.
183. Guowuyuan Guanyu xiugai <Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhishi Chanquan
Haiguan Baohu Tiaoli> de Jueding (Quanwen)
( ) [State Council
Decision Concerning Revisions to the “Regulations on Customs Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights of the PRC” (Complete)] (promulgated Mar. 17, 2010, effective Mar. 24,
2010) (China), art. 27.
184. According to the United Nations, China is the world’s largest counterfeiter. See
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: A THREAT ASSESSMENT 123 (2013), available at http://www
.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2013/TOCTA_EAP_web.pdf
(detailing the prevalence of counterfeit goods in China and noting that between 2008 and
2010, “China was the departure point for roughly 67% of worldwide seizures”).
185. Paragraph three of Article 27 now reads “Where the confiscated goods that in-
fringe on intellectual property rights can be used for the social public welfare undertakings,
Customs shall hand such goods over to relevant public welfare bodies for the use in social
public welfare undertakings. Where the holder of the intellectual property rights intends to
buy them, Customs can assign them to the holder of the intellectual property rights with
compensation. Where the confiscated goods infringing on intellectual property rights cannot
be used for social public welfare undertakings and the holder of the intellectual property
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other usage of the term “import” in this chapter of the regulations, on
legal liability, references both imports and exports.186  In sum, the revised
regulations only address one small element of the problem of reintroduc-
ing counterfeit goods into channels of commerce: counterfeits imported
into China.  This deficiency calls into question analyses about China’s
WTO commitments.  One commentator has argued that the language of
revised Article 27 “shows the country’s good faith effort in bringing its
laws into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement” and “sends a strong sig-
nal to the international community that China takes its WTO obligations
seriously.”187  That seems to be an overly generous interpretation.  By in-
serting the word “imported” into this provision, China dramatically shrank
its applicability.  Indeed, the revised regulation does not address the sub-
stantive problem raised by the panel, instead covering one small subset of
counterfeit goods.  The revised regulation arguably protects China’s coun-
terfeit industry from imported competition.
At the March 19, 2010 DSB Meeting, China asserted that it had com-
pleted all necessary domestic legislative procedures to implement the rul-
ing.188  The United States, however, disagreed with this assessment,
pointing out that the “reasonable period of time” would expire on March
20, 2010, the day after the meeting, and that China had still not made some
required changes.189  Since the regulations came into effect on April 1,
2010, shortly after the expiration time, the United States had a point.  In a
subsequent DSB Meeting, the United States noted China’s failure to pre-
sent a status report.190  The United States disagreed with China’s self-as-
sessment of full implementation, but it did not specify those areas where
implementation was flawed. The United States also noted it was working
“bilaterally” with China to resolve lingering issues.191
rights has no intention to buy them, Customs can, after eradicating the infringing features,
auction them off according to law. But imported goods bearing counterfeit trademarks, except
in special circumstances, shall not be permitted to enter the stream of commerce upon merely
removing the trademark from the goods. Where the infringing features are impossible to erad-
icate, Customs shall destroy the goods. Guowuyuan Guanyu xiugai <Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Zhishi Chanquan Haiguan Baohu Tiaoli> de Jueding (Quanwen)
( ) [State Council
Decision Concerning Revisions to the “Regulations on Customs Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights of the PRC” (Complete)] (promulgated Mar. 17, 2010, effective Mar. 24,
2010) (China), art. 27.
186. Id. art. 29 (“Where the importation or exportation of goods infringing intellectual
property rights constitutes a crime, the offender shall be prosecuted for criminal liability
according to law.”).
187. Yu, supra note 166, at 1092.
188. See World Trade Org. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, ¶ 58, WT/
DSB/M/280 (May 28, 2010).
189. Id. ¶ 59.
190. See World Trade Org. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, ¶ 83, WT/
DSB/M/282 (June 18, 2010).
191. Id.
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China implemented the ruling within a reasonable period of time, or
reasonably close thereto. One could quibble about the timing of the cus-
toms regulations: does the timeliness inquiry target the State Council’s ap-
proval of the revised regulations (March 17), public announcement of its
approval (March 24), or the date the regulations became effective (April
1)?  Regardless, all three dates are close enough to the March 20 expiry
date to moot the issue for this analysis.
But the issue of quality is debatable.  To be sure, China complied with
the obligation to revise part of the Copyright Law.  But China revised its
customs regulations to avoid the clear language and purpose of the DSB.
By covering only imported counterfeit goods, the revised regulation guts
the provision of its primary effect, to limit agency discretion in disposing
of seized counterfeits, and its secondary effect, to discourage Chinese
counterfeiting.  In reality, the revised regulation protects China’s fake-
goods industry by limiting this disposal method to imported counterfeits.
This case highlights the thinness of paper compliance.  China revised the
regulations ostensibly to incorporate the DSB ruling, but the revisions
benefit Chinese counterfeiters, harm foreign counterfeiters, and thwart the
purpose of the ruling and the case itself.
B. Trading Rights & Distribution Services for Publications
& Audiovisuals (DSB 363)
The Chinese government has long censored the importation of foreign
cultural and informational products.192  Currently, the General Adminis-
tration of Press and Publication (GAPP) is the primary agency that de-
cides which books, newspapers, periodicals, audiovisual (AV) products
and other publications may enter China.193  GAPP does this directly,
through monitoring content.  But it also exercises indirect control by au-
thorizing publishers, distributors, and Internet sites to import cultural
products.194  GAPP also coordinates with two other agencies—the State
Administration on Radio, Film and Television195 and the Ministry of Cul-
ture196—to review content of these various media.  In addition, the Minis-
try of Culture selects which entities may import finished audiovisual
products such as CDs and DVDs.197 In this way, the Chinese government
192. Qin, supra note 19, at 271-72.
193. Agencies Responsible for Censorship in China, CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA, http://www.cecc.gov/agencies-responsible-for-censorship-in-china (last visited May
14, 2014).
194. Id.
195. The State Administration on Radio, Film and Television (“SARFT”) performs fi-
nal content review of films for theatrical release. See Appellate Body Report, China – Mea-
sures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 159, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009).
196. The Ministry of Culture performs final content review of AV products. See id. ¶
153.
197. Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶¶ 7.630–7.631, WT/
DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter DS363 August Panel Report].
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tightly controls informational flow within its borders, while ensuring that
the authorizing agency remains under strict control.  The entities selected
to import cultural products remain, as far as is publicly known, state-
owned enterprises.198
In this dispute, the United States charged that Chinese laws and regu-
lations restricted trading rights and market access for cultural products.
First, the United States alleged that China reserved to state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs), the right to import publications, sound recordings, audiovi-
sual home entertainment products (DVDs, VHS cassettes), and films for
theatrical release.  By excluding foreign firms from this type of trade, the
United States argued, China violated national treatment principles found
in both GATT and China’s Accession Protocol.199  Second, the United
States claimed China limited the distribution of publications and audiovi-
sual home products by foreign providers, violating the market access pro-
visions of General Agreement on Trade Services (GATS).200  Third, the
United States challenged various measures that restricted distribution
channels for publications and limited the number of film distributors to
two government-approved SOEs.201
The panel report, nearly 500 pages long, found over two dozen WTO
violations sprinkled throughout various Chinese regulations, catalogs,
rules, opinions and other legal instruments.202  In total, the panel found
provisions of sixteen different regulations inconsistent with GATS, GATT
or a China-specific instrument (AP, WPR).203The Appellate Body upheld
the panel’s decisions both substantively and procedurally and further clari-
fied the application of Article XX defenses to China’s Accession Proto-
col.204  The AB’s affirmation of the panel report suggests China’s
appellate arguments were not particularly strong.  One could interpret
198. Qin, supra note 19, at 283.
199. DS363 August Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶ 2.3(a). Paragraphs 5.1 and 5.1 of
the AP I requires. GATT XI(1) prohibits quotas and other trade-restrictive measures.
200. Id. ¶ 2.3(b).
201. Id. ¶ 2.3(c).
202. I count twenty-nine: twelve AP violations, fifteen GATS violations, and two
GATT violations. See DS363 August Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶¶ 8.1(2)(a)–(d) (finding
twelve provisions, from nine different regulations, to be inconsistent with China’s commit-
ments to open up trading rights in the Accession Protocol); id. ¶¶ 8.2(3)(a)–(c) (finding fif-
teen provisions, from eight different regulations, to be inconsistent with the national
treatment provisions—Articles XVI and XVII—of GATS); id. ¶¶ 8.2(4)(a)(i), 8.2(4)(a)(iii)
(finding two provisions, from three regulations, to violate the national treatment principle—
Article III(4)—of GATT). This again suggests the difficulty of bringing WTO cases against
China. The sheer number of provisions that may violate WTO agreements would overwhelm
any country without a sophisticated trade department, expertise in Chinese law, wherewithal
to comb through dozens of regulations (not all of them translated into English, despite
China’s WTO commitments), expertise to link a suspect provision with a corresponding
WTO violation, and the resources to litigate in the WTO.
203. See id. ¶¶ 8.1(2)–8.2(4)(a)(iii). See also infra App. 3 (listing the sixteen articles,
certain provisions of which were found to be inconsistent with WTO agreements).
204. The AB also upheld the procedural aspects of the Panel Report and delimited the
boundaries of the “public morals” defense that China put forward as a defense. See generally
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China’s use of the appeal procedure as a ploy to postpone the ruling’s
effect, another indication of its increasing sophistication in deploying the
DSB’s procedural mechanisms.  Given the radical overhaul of China’s cen-
sorship system necessary to effectuate the ruling, delay was probably una-
voidable.  China may have bought itself some additional time through the
appeal.  But for the first time, China did not timely implement the DSB’s
recommendations.
Shortly after the DSB issued its report, China and the United States
agreed fourteen months would constitute a “reasonable period of time” to
implement the ruling and recommendations; China would achieve full
compliance by March 19, 2011.205  A few days before the March 19 due
date, China issued a status report, expressing “serious concerns” about the
AB’s and panel’s judgments and highlighting the “complexity and sensitiv-
ity” of the measures singled out therein.206  Despite “tremendous efforts”
to implement the DSB’s rulings and recommendations, China would not
be able to do so fully or in a timely manner.207  China did, however, note it
had made some progress by issuing two regulations: one on AV products
(“Decree 595”) and one on publications (“Decree 594”).208
The two regulations resolved some of the violations described in the
panel report.  For instance, the panel determined that China’s Publications
Regulations only permitted SOEs (but not foreign-invested or private en-
terprises) to import certain types of publications.209  Such a restriction vio-
lated China’s obligations under the Working Party Report (WPR), which
“confirmed that within three years after accession (i.e., 2004), all enter-
prises in China would be granted the right to trade.”210  Decree 594 ad-
Wu, supra note 19 (criticizing the literalist approach of WTO adjudicators and promoting a
more holistic approach to interpretation).
205. See Status Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/17/
Add.2 (Mar. 15, 2011).
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. Id. See also Guowuyuan Guanyu Xiugai ‘Chuban Guanli Tiaoli’ de Jueding
( ) [State Council Decision Concerning Revi-
sions to the ‘Publishing Management Regulations’] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar.
16, 2011, effective Mar. 19, 2011) (China) [hereinafter Decree 594]; Guowuyuan Guanyu
Xiugai ‘Yinxiangzhipin Guanli Tiaoli’de Jueding
( ) [State Council Decision Concerning Revisions
to the ‘Audiovisual Product Management Regulations’] (promulgated by the State Council,
Mar. 16, 2011, effective Mar. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Decree 595].
209. See DS363 August Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶ 7.398.
210. Working Party Report, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, ¶
83(d), WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001). The regulation also violated paragraph 84(a). Id. ¶
84(a) (“China would permit all enterprises in China and foreign enterprises and individuals,
including sole proprietorships of other WTO members, to export and import all goods . . .
throughout the customs territory of China.”).
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dressed this problem by eliminating the regulation’s specific phrase that
only SOEs could qualify as importers.211
The panel further held that the Publication Regulations permitted
Chinese government agencies to exercise discretion in granting the right to
import newspapers and periodicals to foreign-invested enterprises.212  Yet
the WPR required China to grant trading rights “in a non-discriminatory
and non-discretionary way.”213  Despite China’s commitments in the
WPR, however, the Publication Regulations permitted GAPP to “desig-
nate” which entities could import newspapers and periodicals.  This left
GAPP “free to decide whom it wishes to designate from among [a list of
approved entities].”214  This exercise of discretion violated the explicit lan-
guage of the WPR.  Decree 594 excised language from the regulations
granting GAPP the power to designate.215
But the regulations did not fully resolve all the inconsistencies raised
by the panel.  In the status report, China claimed that it had “completed
amendments to most measures at issue,” specifically citing Decrees 595
and 594 as proof of “the sincerity of Chinese Government to implement
the rulings and recommendations of the DSB.”216  The panel determined
that China’s audiovisual regulations, like the publication regulations dis-
cussed above, permitted government agencies to exercise discretion when
deciding which entities to grant a license to import.217  Moreover, the reg-
ulations contained neither processes by which an entity could submit ap-
plications, nor criteria for obtaining a license.218
The WPR specifically prohibits Chinese agencies from exercising dis-
cretion when granting trading rights.219  The challenged audiovisual regu-
lations permitted the relevant government agency—here, the Ministry of
Culture—to exercise discretion in granting trading rights.  Decree 595, is-
sued to cure problems outlined in the panel report,220 did not address the
issue of discretion in licensing.  The Decree does make some cosmetic
changes.  It changes the agencies responsible for certain tasks from the
211. Decree 594, supra note 208, art. XXI (eliminating the SOE requirement from Arti-
cle 42(1)(ii)).
212. See DS363 August Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶ 7.437. A foreign-invested enter-
prise is an independent business entity backed by foreign (non-Chinese) capital. In China,
the most common forms include contract joint ventures, equity joint ventures, and wholly
foreign-owned enterprises.
213. Working Party Report, supra note 210, ¶ 84(b).
214. See DS363 August Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶ 7.436.
215. Decree 594, supra note 208, art. XX.
216. Status Report by China, China – Measures Affecting Trade Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS373/17/
Add.2 (Mar. 15, 2011).
217. DS363 Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶¶ 7.633, 7.656–7.657.
218. Id. ¶ 7.656.
219. Id. ¶ 7.657; see also Working Party Report, supra note 210, ¶ 84(b).
220. Status Report by China, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribu-
tion Devices for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/17/
Add.2 (Mar. 15, 2011).
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Ministry of Culture to GAPP.221  In the context of determining which en-
tities may import finished audiovisual products, it replaces the word “des-
ignate,” which implies the use of discretion, with “approve,” which
suggests a formal process.222  But it leaves intact Article 5, which the panel
specifically found inconsistent.223  The Decree introduces no additional
criteria for licensing, nor does it include an application process, problems
that the panel specifically cited in its analysis.224  Instead, trading rights
can still be granted in a discretionary manner, continuing the violation of
which the United States first complained.
When the reasonable period of time passed in March 2011, China still
had a lot to do.  In a subsequent status report, China described these steps
as yet to be completed: passing an additional regulation,225 publishing a
draft catalog for public comment,226 repealing three measures,227 and re-
221. See Decree 595, supra note 208, art. I (changing the agency in charge of supervising
imports from the Ministry of Culture to GAPP). Compare Yinxiang Zhipin Guanli Tiaoli
( ) [Regulations on Administration of Audio-visual Products] (promulgated
by the State Council on Dec. 25, 2001, effective Feb. 1, 2002), art. 4 (splitting tasks between
GAPP and the Ministry of Culture), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/14/content_1384239.htm. See also Decree 595, supra note 208, art. X (changing the respon-
sible agency for approving entities to import finished audiovisual from Ministry of Culture to
GAPP).
222. Decree 595, supra note 208, art. X.
223. Id.
224. DS363 August Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶ 7.656.
225. See Status Report by China, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distri-
bution Services for Certain Publications, WT/DS363/17/Add.3 (Apr. 11, 2011) [hereinafter
April 11 Status Report] (noting revisions to the Provisions on the Administration of the Pub-
lications Market). The revised Provisions establish requirements and procedures for distribu-
tors, wholesalers and retailers of various publications. Chubanwu Shichang Guanli Guiding
( ) [Provisions on the Administration of the Publications Market]
(promulgated by GAPP and Ministry of Commerce, effective Mar. 25, 2011), order no. 52
(China). The revised Provisions also repealed four regulations: (1) the 2004 version of the
Provisions; (2) Measures on Administering Wholesale, Retail and Rental of Audiovisual Prod-
ucts; (3) Publications Sub-Distribution Rule; and (4) Audiovisual Sub-Distribution Rule. Id.
art. 45.
226. See April 11 Status Report, supra note 225 (describing the publication of Catalogue
of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment). The new catalogue issued in late 2011 and can
be subdivided into encouraged, restricted, and prohibited industries for foreign investment.
Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu (2011 Nian Xiuding)
( ) [Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Invest-
ment (2011 Revision)] (promulgated by the NDRC and Ministry of Commerce, Dec. 24,
2011) order no. 12 (China).
227. According to the status report, China repealed (1) GAPP & MOFTEC, order no.
18, Measures for Administration of Foreign-Invested Book, Periodical and Newspaper Distri-
bution Enterprises (2003) (“Publication (Sub-) Distribution Rule”); (2) Ministry of Culture &
Ministry of Commerce, order no. 28 Measures for Administration of Sino-foreign Distribution
Contractual Joint Ventures of Audiovisual Products (2004) (“Audiovisual (Sub-)Distribution
Rule”); and (3) GAPP, order no. 11, Provisions on the Administration of Publishing Elec-
tronic Publications, (1997) (“1997 Electronic Publications Regulation”). See Status Report by
China, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Pub-
licans and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/17/Add.15 (Apr. 13, 2012) [here-
inafter April 13 Status Report]. The first two measures were repealed in the 2011 Provisions
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vising four additional measures.228  China thus claimed—with the singular
exception of foreign film releases, discussed below—it had “ensured full
implementation of the DSB’s recommendation and rulings.”229  But this
assessment remains premature, for several inconsistent regulations remain
in effect.  For example, the Panel found Article 4 of Several Opinions on
Introducing Foreign Capital into the Cultural Sector to be inconsistent with
China’s obligations under both GATS and the AP.230 This regulation pro-
hibited foreign investment in various sectors, from establishing news agen-
cies, radio stations, television stations, Internet service providers and
motion picture import companies, to importing books, newspapers, peri-
odicals, audiovisual products, and electronic publications.231  The United
States challenged certain aspects of this regulation, including those relat-
ing to motion picture import companies and the importation of books,
newspapers and periodicals.  Yet the regulation remains in effect.  Indeed,
years after the ruling, provincial and city-level governments encourage lo-
cal offices of culture to “earnestly and thoroughly implement” the regula-
tion.232  Far from repealing this regulation, then, local Chinese
government officials urge its application.
noted above. See April 11 Status Report, supra note 225. The third was repealed by a new set
of provisions introduced in February 2008. See Provisions on the Administration of Elec-
tronic Publications (promulgated by General Administration of Press and Publication, Feb.
21, 2008) order no. 34 (China). Art. 63 repeals the 1997 Provisions.  Together, the three regu-
lations posed a total of seven violations: PSDR (4), ASDR (2), and EPR (1).
228. See April 13 Status Report, supra note 227, at 2. The status report mentioned three
regulations described above: (1) Regulations on the Management of Publications, (2) Regula-
tions on the Management of Audiovisual Products, (3) Provisions on the Administration of the
Publications Market. See id. In addition, the status report noted revisions to (1) Catalog of
Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment; (2) Measures for Administration of Subscription of
Imported Publications by Subscribers (aka Imported Publications Subscription Rule); (3)
Measures on the Administration of Importation of Audiovisual Products (aka Audiovisual
Products Import Rules); (4) Several Opinions of the Ministry of Culture on Development and
Administration of Network Music. See id.
229. Id.
230. See DS363 August Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶¶ 7.374, 7.1043 (finding viola-
tions of the Accession Protocol and GATS XVII).
231. Guanyu Wenhua Lingyu Yinjin Waizide Ruogan Yijian
( ) [Several Opinions on the Introduction of Foreign Capi-
tal into the Culture Sector] (promulgated by the Ministry of Culture) order no. 19, art. 4
(2005), available at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/c023b26048d7c1c708a14548.html. See also
DS363 August Panel Report supra note 197, ¶ 7.363.
232. The regulation is listed as valid on websites in both English and Chinese. See, e.g.,
Wenhuabu, Guojia Guanbo Dianying Dianshi Zongju, Zinwen Chuban Shu, Guojia Fazhan
He Gaige Wei Yuanhui, Shangwubu Guanyu Wenhua Lingyu Yinjin Waizideruogan Yijian
(
) [Several Opinions of the Ministry of Culture, State Administra-
tion of Radio, Film and Television, General Administration of Press and Publication, Na-
tional Development and Reform Commission, and the Ministry of Commerce on Canvassing
Foreign Investment into the Cultural Sector] (effective June 7, 2005) (China) (listing the reg-
ulation as effective in English). Recently, several local and provincial government bodies
have released notices directing local Cultural Affairs offices “earnestly and thoroughly to
implement the regulation.” See, e.g., Shaanxisheng Wenhuating Zhuanfa
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Several other inconsistent regulations remain in effect. For example,
Regulations on the Administration of Films,233 Film Enterprise Rule,234
and Network Music Opinions235—all of which contained at least one in-
consistent provision—remain in effect.  It is possible that certain issues,
such as importing films into Chinese cinemas, were resolved bilaterally
between China and the United States. But the fact that these regulations
remain on the books means that other WTO members may still not access
various sectors of the Chinese internet, film, and publication markets.  It
also belies China’s claim of achieving “full implementation” of the DSB’s
recommendations.
The final piece of the implementation puzzle took shape in a May
2012 MOU between the United States and China, resolving issues about
distribution and the release of foreign films in Chinese theaters.  China
Wenhuabudengbumen Guanyu Wenhua Lingyu Yinjin Waizide Ruogan Yijiande Tongzhi
( ) [Notice from the
Shaanxi Province Ministry of Culture Telling the Office of Culture and Other Departments
about Several Opinions on Introducing Foreign Capital into the Cultural Sector] (effective
Sept. 4, 2012) (China), available at govinfo.nlc.gov.cn/shanxsfz/xxgk/sxswht/201209/
t20120904_2515104.shtml? classid=401).
233. Dianying Guanli Tiaoli ( ) [Regulation on the Management of Films]
(promulgated by State Council Dec. 25, 2001) order no. 342 (China) [hereinafter Film Regu-
lation], available at http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2007/02/16/20070913144431120333.html.
The panel found Article 30 gave SARFT discretion to designate film-importing entities, in
violation of the Working Party Report. DS363 August Panel Report, supra note 199, ¶ 7.576.
The State Council listed this regulation as “adjusted” in its Sixth Decision to Cancel and
Adjust Administrative Approval Programs. See Guowuyuan Guanyu Diliupi Quxiao he
Tiaozheng Xingzheng Shenpi Xiangmude Jueding,
( ) [Sixth Decision to Cancel and Adjust
Administratrive Approval Programs], order 52 (2012), available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/
2012-10/10/content_2240096.htm. Yet the Decision merely states that provincial level agen-
cies, instead of the central-level SARFT, will oversee the regulation’s implementation. See id.
app. 2, arts. 64–65. It does not state whether its provisions—including Article 30, which vio-
lated China’s Accession Protocol—have been amended. Several government websites indi-
cate that the regulation is still in effect. See, e.g., Falu¨ Fagui Shujuku, ( ) [Law
and Regulation Database], FAZHIWANG [LEGAL DAILY], http://law.legaldaily.com.cn/
law_content.php?law_id=ebe922af8d4560c73368a88eeac07d167626&key_word (last visited
May 14, 2014) (listing the regulations as in effect). Legal Daily is a Chinese newspaper run by
the Ministry of Justice. See also Jiangyin City Cultural Broadcasting News and Publication
Bureau, http://wgxj.jiangyin.gov.cn/swgxj/sitePages/subPages/1350750001183742.html (listing
the regulations as in effect).
234. Dianying Qiye Jingying Zige Zhunru Zanxing Guiding
( ) [Provisional Rules on Entry Criteria for Operating Film
Enterprises] (promulgated by SARFT & Ministry of Commerce) (2004), available at http://
www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2004/11/10/20091203144241960335.html. The panel found Article
16, which vested the approval of film-importing enterprises in SARFT, inconsistent with
GATS. See DS363 August Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶ 7.598 (“[B]y providing in Article
16 that only SARFT-approved enterprises may import films, China has failed to ensure that
all enterprises in China have the right to import films.”). This violated the trading rights
provisions of the Working Party Report, paras. 83(d) and 84(a). Id.
235. Wangluo Yinyue Fazhan he Guanlide Ruogan Yijian
( ) [Several Opinions on the Development and Management
of Network Music] (promulgated by Ministry of Culture, Dec. 11, 2006) (China).
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would permit fourteen “enhanced-format” films (3D, IMAX, etc.) per cal-
endar year, in addition to the twenty films currently permitted under
China’s GATS schedule.236  Most germane to the present discussion,
“China agreed that the licensing of [film] distributors would be conducted
in a non-discretionary and non-discriminatory manner.”237  This language
addresses various cases wherein the panel determined Chinese agencies
exercise discretion in the approval process.
But some skepticism is warranted.  Many inconsistent laws remain in
effect, and their influence is amplified by provincial and local-level regula-
tions that cite to them.  Even if Chinese officials negotiated the Memoran-
dum of Understanding [MOU] in good faith and pledged that licensing
would take place in a certain manner, local authorities may not heed their
call.  With inconsistent regulations still on the books, local authorities can
invoke them to promote local interests.  Indeed, by transferring approval
authority from the centrallevel to the provinciallevel, as certain regula-
tions do,238 it is now less likely that the central government can control the
approval process as envisioned in the MOU.  More likely, a local official
will exercise his newfound control in a discretionary or discriminatory
manner.  The local official may simply not know about the MOU, or may
have plausible reasons—promoting a local company at the expense of a
foreign one, for example—to ignore its mandate.
In this case, China failed to implement its WTO commitments.  Qin
writes the failure is “not surprising.”239 Full implementation would have
required completely dismantling the Chinese government’s monopoly on
importing information and culture, as well as the vast censorship regime
embedded within it.  China made good-faith efforts, as outlined above, to
implement the decision.  And the United States and China both signed an
MOU ending the dispute.  Yet a number of regulations remain in effect,
suggesting that China did not even reach paper compliance here.  But the
United States, by signing the MOU, chose to end the dispute, perhaps
because the film industry was satisfied with, or at least resigned to the
inevitability of, the terms.
C. Financial Information Services (DSB 373, March 2008)
A similar case involved Chinese restrictions on financial-information
providers.  The United States—later joined by the European Communities
and Canada—alleged that China restricted market access and applied dis-
criminatory requirements to foreign providers.240  In its March 2008 re-
236. Joint Communication from China and the United States, China – Measures Affect-
ing Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual En-
tertainment Products, WT/DS363/19 (May 11, 2012).
237. Id. ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
238. See, e.g., DS363 August Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶ 7.1680(D).
239. Qin, supra note 19, at 272.
240. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China – Measures Affecting
Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers, WT/DS373/1, S/
L/320 (Mar. 5, 2008).
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quest for consultations, the United States submitted a dozen Chinese
regulations that obstructed foreign companies from supplying financial in-
formation to PRC end-users.241
The United States claimed that foreign providers had to channel their
services through a commercial entity designated by Xinhua News Agency,
itself a government department.  Xinhua, however, ran a competing finan-
cial information service called “Xinhua 08,” creating a conflict of inter-
est.242  The United States further alleged that China prohibited users from
directly subscribing to services provided by foreign suppliers.  Finally, and
perhaps most controversially, foreign providers had to hand commercially
valuable information—including confidential information about services
and customers—over to China’s Foreign Information Administration
Center.  This case thus also challenged China’s monopoly on commercially
valuable knowledge, part of the informational infrastructure and censor-
ship complex.  The sum of these requirements accorded foreign service-
providers less favorable treatment than comparable Chinese providers,
such as Xinhua.  The United States claimed these measures prevented for-
eign suppliers from establishing a meaningful commercial presence in
China, violating GATS and the Accession Protocol.
The case settled quickly, perhaps so China could keep its informa-
tional infrastructure intact.  On December, 4, 2008, China and the United
States informed the DSB that they had signed a three-pronged MOU.243
First, by January 31, 2009, China agreed to appoint a new regulator of
financial information services not accountable to another financial infor-
mation provider.  China further guaranteed that the instrument appointing
this new regulator would supersede a 1995 Circular, which “will no longer
be implemented.”244  Second, China agreed to issue new measures by
April 30, 2009 that would “replace” the licensing scheme established
under a 2006 regulation.245  These measures would permit foreign provid-
ers to supply financial information without a Chinese agent or intermedi-
ary, would accord them treatment no less favorable than that received by
Chinese providers, and would conform to commitments China made in the
Working Party Report.246  Third, China would issue new measures by Jan-
uary 31, 2009 so that foreign providers would be subject to the new
regulator.
241. Id. at 2–3.
242. See European Comm’n, Directorate-General for Trade, China – Measures Affect-
ing the Supply of Financial Information Services (“Xinhua”): State of Play 1 (June 25, 2009),
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/july/tradoc_144159.pdf.
243. See Joint Communication from China and the United States, China – Measures
Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers, WT/
DS373/4, S/L/320/Add.1 (Dec. 9, 2008).
244. See id. ¶ 2(f).
245. Id. ¶ 2(a).
246. Id. ¶ 2(b).
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On January 29, 2009, China’s State Council issued Order 548.247  The
Order transferred approval authority from Xinhua to the State Council
Information Office.248  It did not, however, annul the 1995 Circular, a seri-
ous omission of the pledge to “replace” the 1995 Circular.  Moreover, vari-
ous Chinese government websites—including Legal Daily, an official news
outlet administered by the Ministry of Justice—list the 1995 Circular as “in
effect.”249  As above, local- and provincial-level agencies cite the Circular
as effective law, and make policy and approval decisions accordingly.
Since the 1995 Circular significantly disadvantages foreign enterprises, the
possibility of new obstacles for foreign news - and information - providers
remains distinct.250
On April 30, 2009, China issued new administrative measures (“2009
Measures”),251 which take steps towards insuring the DSB’s ruling.  First,
the 2009 Measures designate the State Council Information Office [SCIO]
as the new regulator and require it to protect commercially valuable infor-
mation received in the approval process.252  Second, the Measures also
specify the procedures and requirements a foreign provider must meet in
order to supply financial information services in China.253  The SCIO will
make the decision to approve, or not, within 30 days of the application; if
the office disapproves an application, it will notify the applicant with writ-
ten reasons.254  Third, the Measures allow foreign providers to supply fi-
nancial information directly to customers in China, instead of going
through an intermediary like the China Economic Information Service.
247. Guowuyuan Guanyu Xiugai “Guowuyuan Dui Quexu Baoliude Xingzheng Shenpi
Xiangmu Sheding Xingzheng Xukede Jueding”
( ) [Decision of the
State Council to Amend the “Decision on Establishing Administrative Permission for the
Administrative Examination and Approval of Items that Must Be Retained”] (promulgated
by the State Council of the People’s Rep. of China, Jan. 29, 2009, effective Jan. 29, 2009).
248. Id. art. 2 (transferring authority to approve financial information service provid-
ers); Id. art. 3 (transferring authority to approve foreign news agencies).
249. See, e.g., Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Shouquan Xinhua Tongxunshe Dui
Waiguo Tongxunshe Ji Qi Suoshu Xinxi Jigou Zai Zhongguo Jingnei Fabu Jingji Xinxi Shix-
ing Guikou Guanlide Tongzhi [State Council on the Implementation of the Notification Au-
thorized Xinhua News Agency Centralized Management of Foreign News Agencies and
Their Information Agencies Released Economic Information in China] (effective Dec. 31,
1995),  http://law.legaldaily.com.cn/law_content.php?law_id=3556a3018cce3076e27dbbf9645b
44d58956&key_word= [hereinafter Circular].
250. See, e.g., id. art. 5(“No department or unit may directly subscribe to a foreign news
agency, or its informational affiliates, for economic information.”).
251. Provisions on Administration of Provision of Financial Information Services in
China by Foreign Institutions [Waiguo Jigou zai Zhongguo Jingnei Tigong Jinrong Xinxi
Fuwu Guanli Jueding] (promulgated by State Council Information Office, Ministry of Com-
merce, and State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Apr. 30, 2009, effective June 1,
2009), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/july/tradoc_144158.pdf.
252. Id. arts. 4, 12.
253. Id. arts. 5–6.
254. Id. art. 7. If implemented, this provision would go a long way towards shedding
light on China’s opaque administrative decision-making.
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Fourth, foreign providers may now independently establish a full commer-
cial presence in China, through a fully foreign-invested enterprise, and en-
gage in a broader array of commercial activities.  The 2009 Measures
derive from the SCIO and Ministry of Commerce, placing them above
Xinhua in the legal hierarchy.
China timely implemented most of the commitments made in the
MOU, passing two regulations to level the inequality of treatment be-
tween foreign and domestic providers.  But this only provides paper com-
pliance.  By leaving the 1995 Circular in effect, China still subjects foreign
service-providers to onerous requirements.  The 2009 Measures address
many problems of the 1995 Circular, including a catch-all provision to an-
nul prior regulations “inconsistent” with the 2009 Measures.  But the of-
fending provisions of the 1995 Circular do not directly contradict the 2009
Measures; rather, they impose obligations on foreign providers not placed
on Chinese ones.255  As in the audiovisuals case (DS 363), China leaves
regulations in effect that could prejudice foreign companies.  China
achieved paper compliance by introducing the two new regulations, but
also left in effect a regulation that could be used to discriminate against
foreign companies.
Since the number of WTO cases involving China is small, certitude
about China’s future conduct in the DSB would be inapt.  But certain pat-
terns are clear.  First, in the majority of cases, China has revised its legal
and regulatory systems to comply with the DSB rulings.  It has done so
typically within the reasonable period of time in which it agreed to do so
and has accumulated a strong record in terms of the quality of its imple-
mentation.  Moreover, as of July 2013, no Chinese case has gone into com-
pliance proceedings, wherein an arbitration panel determines the costs of
one country’s non-compliance to other WTO members.  This is a signifi-
cant difference from other major trading partners, such as the United
States, E.U., and Japan, all of which have been respondents in compliance
proceedings.256  Some of these cases have dragged on for more than a dec-
ade, indicating a resistance to WTO rulings far and above anything that
China has exhibited.
Second, China has found ways to resist WTO rulings and norms.  In-
consistent regulations remain in effect.  In the three cases discussed
above—DS 362 (intellectual property enforcement), DS 363 (trading
rights for publications) DS 373 (financial information services)—inconsis-
tent regulations either continue in effect or were revised so as not to effec-
255. See Circular, supra note 249, art. 5 (“No department or unit may directly subscribe
to a foreign news agency, or its informational affiliates, for economic information.”). This
provision does not contradict any language in the 2009 Measures.
256. See, e.g., Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WTO, http://www
.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds245_e.htm (last visited May 14, 2014) (DS 245);
European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm (last visited May 14, 2014)
(DS 26); U.S. – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WTO, https://www.wto
.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds322_e.htm (last visited May 14, 2014) (DS 322).
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tuate the purpose of the ruling.  This lacuna could be a function of
institutional capacity.  China’s capacious bureaucratic institutions produce
reams of regulations; it is unclear whether many of them keep close tabs
on the various regulations they produce, and quite definite that some of
them have not repealed regulations found to be inconsistent.  Or there
may be a more sinister explanation: China wants to keep the inconsistent
regulations in place, and understands that its regulatory maze may be too
labyrinthine for other WTO members to navigate.  Whether by design or
neglect, a number of inconsistent regulations continue to plague China’s
compliance record.  Moreover, local and provincial-level regulations often
amplify the effects of inconsistent national regulations.  In cases such as
DS 363 and DS 373, lower-level government agencies have promulgated
policies that reference regulations that were either revoked or found in-
consistent.  This means that WTO-inconsistent regulations will cast a regu-
latory afterglow at various levels of the Chinese legal system.
The most striking case of non-compliance, so far, has been the trading
rights case (DS 363).  The revisions suggested by the DSB challenged
China’s censorship regime and long-held monopoly on cultural informa-
tion.  Not only did China not comply within a reasonable period of time,
but it also left in place several regulations that the DSB deemed inconsis-
tent with WTO disciplines.  This suggests that, in particularly sensitive ar-
eas, China will not fulfill its implementation obligations.  As China
continues to gain experience with WTO litigation, instances of non-imple-
mentation are likely to increase.  China has, in essence, learned that it can
“get away” without fully complying with DSB rulings and recommenda-
tions.  Indeed, as noted above, two recent rulings show just how far China
is willing to push the implementation envelope.
Third, reforming laws in China means less than it would in Western
liberal democracies with robust legal institutions.  One-party rule, coupled
with a unitary governance structure, allow the party-state to control the
passage of laws and regulations, dictate revisions to the domestic legal en-
vironment, and coordinate changes with a maximum of speed and mini-
mum of institutional friction.  China has tinkered with the literal letter of
its law, but it continues to produce a whole range of programs that violate
WTO principles.  It is perhaps unrealistic to think the DSB can induce
compliance more broadly, that is, outside of the regulation challenged. But
it is doubtful that China’s domestication of DSB rulings has meaningfully
influenced the development of its political economy.  Many basic norms—
market capitalism, deregulation, strong protection of intellectual property,
limits on subsidies—remain alien to China.
Fourth, many WTO violations take place in the interstices of law, ar-
eas where government officials exercise discretion: whether or not to reg-
ister a foreign company, to issue it a business license, or to prosecute
someone for IP theft.  Likewise, China distributes trade regulations to
governmental agencies as “internal guidance” (neibu cankao) that should
be published under China’s WTO transparency obligations, but in fact
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never are.257  The dispute settlement system provides a very rough tool by
which to reshape a member’s domestic legal system and to monitor its
implementation of WTO commitments.  A range of violations takes place,
either below the radar or without meaningful recourse for investors or
manufacturers outside of China.
Finally, China deploys the tactical features of the dispute settlement
system to buffer the ruling’s impact.  China settles “easy” cases early and
prolongs decisions that seriously disrupt its political system, harm core ec-
onomic interests, or require significant internal reform to implement.  Like
any other national actor, China seeks to maximize its interests and mini-
mize disruptions that international law and institutions may inflict upon its
domestic legal and regulatory systems.
CONCLUSION
When China first joined the WTO, its conduct in the Dispute Settle-
ment Body was more or less exemplary.  Many questioned whether an au-
thoritarian country with communist leanings and a long history of
government intervention could transition to the neoliberal blueprint of the
WTO. To date, China has timely complied with the rulings and recommen-
dations of the DSB in a qualitatively sound manner in most (five out of
eight) cases.  Still, implementation problems have arisen recently, because
China did not annul all regulations as it pledged to do (in cases that set-
tled) or as it was directed to do (in cases where the DSB issued a final
ruling).  China has learned the rules of the game, and understands that a
record of complete compliance is neither necessary nor expected of great
trading powers.  This has implications for both realist literature, with its
emphasis on interest maximizing behavior, as well as constructivist per-
spectives, which predict that a state will adapt to the expectations and be-
haviors of other institutional members.  It may also reflect an increasingly
assertive China, one willing to push the limits of the international order,
but not completely dispensing with it.
Viewed in this light, China’s implementation efforts are best under-
stood as paper compliance.  Despite amendments to its legal and regula-
tory structures, China continues to implement policies that contravene the
WTO’s neoliberal prescription of low tariffs, minimal export restrictions,
market access, equal treatment of foreign investment, and strong intellec-
tual property rights.  And in several cases, China has subverted the DSB’s
ruling by maintaining inconsistent laws or revising regulations in a non-
compliant manner.  As China continues to grow in size, stature and eco-
nomic power, it will continue to push up against the boundaries of the
international system.  China has yet to transgress well-established bounda-
ries, at least in the sphere of international trade, but instead seems to treat
257. Testimony Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 112th Cong. 2–3 (2011) (tes-
timony of Claire Reade, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for China Affairs), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2011/december/testimony-assis
tant-united-states-trade-rep.
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the rules of international trade as many other large economies do: a set of
norms and practices to be obeyed when fairly practicable, and overlooked
when they cannot.
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APPENDIX 1: CHART OF RESOLVED CASES
This summarizes the five disputes where China fully complied (as far
as is publicly known) with the DSB ruling.  Pertinent information includes
the disposition, violating laws and regulations, a summary of the remedial
action, and whether China achieved compliance in a timely (T) or qualita-
tively sound (Q) manner.
No. Violating Laws T? Q? Remedial Action Disposition
Eliminated309 6 regulations Y Y Srefunds to firms
C pledged to340 3 regulations Y Y Achange law
Amended 4
358 6 bundles Y Y bundles, S
challenged 2
Took steps to
387 118 regulations Y Y eliminate S
measures
Eliminated export394 4 regulations Y Y Arestrictions
APPENDIX 2: CHART OF UNRESOLVED CASES
No. Violating Laws T? Q? Remedial Action Disposition
Regulations limited by363 1 law, 2 regulations Y N A“imported”
Inconsistent
372 16 regulations N N regulations remain in A
effect
Inconsistent
372 2 regulations Y N regulations remain in S
effect
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APPENDIX 3: CHINESE REGULATORY VIOLATIONS IN CASE 363
Because of the large number of regulations, this case deserved its own
appendix.  The sections follow the format used in the panel report.  But
the numbering of the regulations is mine.  Because certain regulations vio-
lated both the Accession Protocol and GATS, I chose not to double-count
them.  Accordingly, each regulation is numbered only the first time it
appears.
I. AP Violations
1. National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of
Commerce, No. 57, Catalog of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment
(2007) (“Catalog”)
2. State Council, no. 346, Regulations Guiding the Orientation of For-
eign Investment (2002) (“Foreign Investment Regulation”)
3. Ministry of Culture, SARFT, NDRC, GAPP, Ministry of Com-
merce, order no. 19, Several Opinions on the Introduction of Foreign Capi-
tal into the Cultural Sector (2005) (“Several Opinions”)
4. State Council, order no. 343, Regulations on the Management of
Publications (2001) (“Publications Regulation”)
5. State Council, order no. 342, Regulations on the Management of
Films (2004)(“Film Regulation”)
6. SARFT & Ministry of Commerce, no. 43, Provisional Rules on En-
try Criteria for Operating Film Enterprise (2004) (“Film Enterprise Rule”)
7. State Council, order no. 341, Regulations on the Management of
Audiovisual Products (2001) (“2001 Audiovisual Products Regulations”)
8. Ministry of Culture and GAC, no. 23, Rules for the Management of
the Import of Audiovisual Products (2002) (“Audiovisual Products Impor-
tation Rule”)
9. Ministry of Culture & Ministry of Commerce, no. 28, Rules for the
Management of Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures for the Sub-
Distribution of Audiovisual Products (2003) (“Audiovisual (Sub) Distribu-
tion Rule”)
II. GATS violations
10. GAPP, order 27, Rules for the Management of Subscribers Placing
Subscriptions for Imported Publications (2004) (“Imported Publications
Subscription Rule”)
11. GAPP & MOFTEC, order no. 18, Rules for the Management of
Foreign Invested Enterprises Sub-Distributing Books, Newspapers and Pe-
riodicals (2003) (“Publications Sub-Distribution Rule”)
12. GAPP, Administrative Rules for the Publications Market (2004)
(“Publications Market Rule”)
13. GAPP, order no. 11, Regulations on the Management of Electronic
Publications (1997) (“1997 Electronics Publication Regulation”)
14. Ministry of Culture, Notice on Some Issues Relating to Implemen-
tation of the “Interim Rules on the Management of Internet Culture” (2003)
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(“Circular on Internet Culture”) (with below)
15. Ministry of Culture, no. 27, Interim Rules on the Management of
on Internet Culture (2003) (“Circular on Internet Culture”) (with above)
16. Ministry of Culture, Several Opinions on the Development and
Management of Network Music (2006) (“Network Music Opinions”)
III. GATT Violations
1. Imported Publications Subscription Rule (see 10, above)
2. Publications Sub-Distribution Rule, conjoined with Publications
Market Rule (see 11 &12, above)
